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MEDIA VIOLENCE AND THE OBSCENITY
EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Kevin W. Saunders*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public has grown uncomfortable with the depictions of violence
now so prevalent in the entertainment media.' The now familiar statistics
show that by the time a child, who watches two to four hours of television
per day, is twelve, the child has observed 8,000 murders and 100,000 other
acts of violence.2 There is growing concern that this exposure to violence
fuels the violence that seems to be becoming more common in our society.
Congress has begun, once again,4 to study the issue of violence in
media. In recent hearings, the heads of the major television networks were
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received from the conference participants were appreciated. The author also thanks law
librarian John Michaud and law student Craig Sanders for their research assistance during
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See, e.g., John Dillin, Senate Hearings Lambaste High Level of TV Violence,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 10, 1993, at 1 ("Top entertainment officials are under
mounting pressure from lawmakers and the public to rid both TV and movies of excessive
violence."); Editorial, Getting a Handle on Video Violence, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June
3, 1993, at A12 ("Increasingly, Americans want more control over the degree of violence
their children see on TV and are exposed to through video games."); Robert L. Jackson,
TV Execs Vow Stronger Effort to Reduce Violence, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at F2
("Television executives, under pressure from Congress to reduce violence in programs
seen by children, pledged Friday to work harder to reduce depictions of mayhem that
often are imitated by young viewers.").
2 See Dillin, supra note 1, at 1.
' See id. (reporting Senate hearing comment of Senator Simon) ('I'm not suggesting
television is the cause of violence in our society. But it is a cause.' He says scientific
research proves a direct link between criminal behavior and screen violence. 'We know
that to be a fact,' he says." ); see also infra notes 439-43 and accompanying text.
4 In 1969 the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence found
a link between television violence and aggressive behavior. See infra notes 439-43 and
accompanying text. The issue of the relationship between crime or horror comic books
and violence also has drawn the attention of Congress. See Hearings Before the Subcomm.
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called before the Senate Judiciary Committee to answer for their
depictions of murder and mayhem.5 Congress clearly will consider some
controls on media depictions of violence if the media themselves do not
exercise self-control.6
Thus far, Congress has been rather timid in its actions. It enacted the
Television Program Improvement Act of 1990,' but the Act provides only
an exemption from antitrust laws for any industry discussion or agreement
to limit violent material on television,8 without requiring any such limits.
In a more recent effort, bills were introduced in both houses of Congress
calling for the establishment of a "Television Violence Report Card." 9
These bills require only that the Federal Communications Commission
evaluate and rate the violence on television programs and rate sponsors on
the violence of the programs on which they advertise. Although the results
would be published in the Federal Register, there is no provision, other
than potential public reaction to the reports, for decreasing the violent
content of the television fare. Another bill goes somewhat further and
would require that warnings as to the nature of the material about to air
accompany any broadcast of violent material.1l Even this bill would not
limit violence but would, at least, provide some opportunity for parents to
control the exposure of their children to such material.
Congress' unwillingness to take direct action to limit depictions of
violence in the media may be explained by first amendment concerns.
Certainly, the entertainment industry has shown little reluctance to claim
the protection of the amendment. As Jack Valenti, President of the Motion
Picture Association of America, warned the Senate Judiciary Committee,
"If you push and shove people, they're going to shove back. And re-
member, they have the armor of a thing called the 1st Amendment.""
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954).
' Oversight Hearing on the Television Program Improvement Act of 1990 Before the
Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Oversight Hearing
on the Television Program Improvement Act of 1990 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution and Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice Joint Hearing, 103d Cong. 1st Sess
(1993).
6 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1 ("At a House hearing earlier this month, several
members of Congress signaled a growing impatience with the industry's effort to police
itself. Even Congressional liberals who traditionally oppose censorship have said
government restraints may be enacted." ).
7 47 U.S.C. § 303c (1992).
8 47 U.S.C. § 303c(c) (1992).
S . 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
0 S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Editorial, Protected Violence, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1993, at 15 (quoting Mr.
Valenti's comments to the Senate Judiciary Committee).
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Thomas Murphy, Chairman of Capital Cities/ABC similarly invoked con-
stitutional protection: "[T]he government must exercise restraint in inter-
fering with the content of the programming the media portrays. Our
founding fathers had the wisdom to recognize the importance of freedom
of expression to democratic self-governance. We must guard the freedom
zealously."' 2
At least one member of the Federal Communications Commission
seems willing to take more direct action. Commissioner James Quello has
suggested that the application of the FCC's approach to the broadcast of
indecent material be carried over to violent material.' 3 The FCC's
regulatory authority to channel violent material into hours when children
are unlikely to be in the viewing audience would seem established under
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation.4 Although Pacifica did involve the
broadcast of words referring to sexual and excretory activities, common
subject matters of obscenity doctrine, the broadcast was not obscene but
merely indecent. 5 The same factors that justified the channeling of
indecent, nonobscene sexual and excretory references, 6 the pervasive
presence of the broadcast media, its invasion of the home, and its
accessibility to young children, 7 could justify the channeling of indecently
violent material.18
Even if violent material were channeled into time slots not likely to
draw an audience of children, problems still remain. We may not be quite
as concerned about the exposure of eighteen year-olds to nonobscene, but
indecent, sexual material as we are with the exposure of young children to
such material. Individuals in their late teens and early twenties, however,
may present great concerns with regard to exposure to violent material.
Although channeling might protect children in their formative years, it
would not prevent the exposure of such material to young adults, whose
appetite for violence may be increased 19 or who may be led to imitate the
12 Jackson, supra note 1, at F2 (quoting Mr. Murphy's comments to the Senate
Judiciary Committee).
"3 F.C.C. Chief Backs T.V. Violence Laws, Consumer Group Seeks Limits, Especially
in Kids'Hours, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1993, at 9.
14 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
"5 Id. at 741.
16 Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring).
17 id.
s Pacifica would not support the channeling of violent material if it is read to require
the same focus on sex and excretion contained in the obscenity cases. Nonetheless, the
thesis of this Article is that violent material can be obscene based solely on its level of
violence. Such a conclusion would justify a total ban and thus would justify channeling.
"9 See infra notes 439-43 and accompanying text.
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action. 20 Furthermore, even with the broadcast media channeled, there
remain the problems of cable programming, movies, and even comic
books.21
Several states also have attempted to limit access to materials depicting
violence.22 Those states have, however, limited their attempts to controlling
access by minors. Such limitations to minors may be based on a political
or philosophical unwillingness to censor materials made available to the
adult population, but they also may be based on a belief that a general ban
on violent material would be unconstitutional.
Missouri is among the states that have imposed such a ban.23 The
Missouri approach was to mirror the Miller v. California24 test for
obscenity,25 with violence substituted for sex and with the insertion, where
called for, of "under the age of seventeen. 2 ' Thus, the appeal to the
20 See, e.g., Stephanie J. Berman, Comment, View at Your Own Risk: Gang Movies
and Spectator Violence, 12 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 477 (1992) (detailing incidents in which
gang violence arguably has been triggered by gang movies).
21 Comic books were the focus of much early concern over violent material. See
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment
Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1290-91 (1978); Note, Crime
Comics and the Constitution, 7 STAN. L. REV. 237, 237-38, 248-51 (1955).
22 See Jassalyn Hershinger, Note, State Restrictions on Violent Expression: The
Impropriety of Extending an Obscenity Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1993).
23 Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.090 (Supp. 1992).
24 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
25 Id. at 24.
26 MO. REV. STAT. § 573.090 (Supp. 1993) provides:
Video cassettes, morbid violence, to be kept in separate area-sale or rental to
persons under seventeen prohibited, penalties
1. Video cassettes or other video reproduction devices, or the jackets, cases or
coverings of such video reproduction devices shall be displayed or maintained in a
separate area if the same are pornographic for minors as defined in section 573.010,
or if:
(1) Taken as a whole and applying contemporary community standards, the
average person would find that it has a tendency to cater or appeal to morbid
interest in violence for persons under the age of seventeen; and
(2) It depicts violence in a way which is patently offensive to the average person
applying contemporary adult community standards with respect to what is suitable
for persons under the age of seventeen; and
(3) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for persons under the age of seventeen.
2. Any video cassettes or other video reproduction devices meeting the
description in subsection 1 of this section shall not be rented or sold to a person
under the age of seventeen years.
3. Any violation of the provisions of subsection 1 or 2 of this section shall be
punishable as an infraction, unless such violation constitutes furnishing pornographic
materials to minors as defined in section 573.040, in which case it shall be
110 [Vol. 3:1
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prurient interest aspect of the Miller test becomes "appeal to morbid
interest in violence for persons under the age of seventeen," 27 and the
serious value aspect becomes "[t]aken as a whole, it lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for persons under the age of
seventeen.' '28
Tennessee 29 also has adopted a statute restricting the dissemination of
violent material to minors, and Colorado 30 has adopted a similar one as
punishable as a class A misdemeanor or class D felony as prescribed in section
573.040, or unless such violation constitutes promoting obscenity in the second
degree as defined in section 573.030, in which case it shall be punishable as a class
A misdemeanor or class D felony as prescribed in section 573.030.
27 Id. § 573.090(l)(1).
28 Id. § 573.090(1)(3).
29 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-911 (1993) provides:
Sale, loan or exhibition of material to minors.
(a) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly sell or loan for monetary
consideration or otherwise exhibit or make available to a minor:
(1) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar
visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body, which
depicts nudity, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado- masochistic abuse, and
which is harmful to minors; or
(2) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however reproduced, or sound
recording, which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (a)(l), or which
contains explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual
excitement, sexual conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which
is harmful to minors.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly exhibit to a minor for monetary
consideration, or to knowingly sell to a minor an admission ticket or pass or
otherwise admit a minor to premises whereon there is exhibited a motion picture,
show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual
conduct, excess violence, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to
minors.
(c) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
(d) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the minor
to whom the material or show was made available or exhibited was, at the time,
accompanied by his parent or legal guardian, or by an adult with the written
permission of the parent or legal guardian.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-914 (1993) provides:
Display for sale or rental of material harmful to minors.
(a) It is unlawful for a person to display for sale or rental a visual depiction,
including a videocassette tape or film, or a written representation, including a book,
magazine or pamphlet, which contains material harmful to minors anywhere minors
are lawfully admitted.
30 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-601 (West 1992) provides:
Dispensing violent films to minors-misdemeanors
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
well. The Tennessee statute groups excessively violent material with
sexually explicit material and bans the dissemination of either to minors."
The Colorado statute, like Missouri's, employs a scheme similar to that of
Miller. Colorado, however, limits its ban on violent material to "work
[that] depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, repeated acts of
actual, not simulated, violence resulting in serious bodily injury or
death. ' 3
2
The states' attempts to limit media depictions of violence, even though
limited to minors, have not been well received by the courts. The Missouri
statute was challenged in Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster.33
The district court held that even violent material enjoys first amendment
protection and that any ban would have to meet strict scrutiny by being
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest.34 Furthermore, the
court rejected the argument that violent material is obscene, stating that
"[u]nlike obscenity, violent expression is protected by the First
Amendment. ' 35 The affirming Eighth Circuit opinion also required that
the state show that the statute was narrowly drawn to advance an
articulated, compelling governmental interest and that its means were
carefully tailored to achieve that purpose. 36 The court specifically rejected
the argument that violence is obscene, stating that obscenity encompasses
only sexual conduct. 37 The aspects of the Tennessee statute addressing
violence also were declared unconstitutional. The state supreme court, in
(1) No person shall sell, rent, or otherwise furnish to a minor any video tape,
video disc, film representation, or other form of motion picture if:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find
that the work, taken as a whole, predominantly appeals to the interest in violence;
and
(b) The work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, repeated acts of
actual, not simulated, violence resulting in serious bodily injury or death; and
(c) The work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
(2) For the purposes of this section, "minor" means any person under eighteen
years of age, and "serious bodily injury" shall be defined as provided in section
18-1-901(3)(p).
(3) Any person who violates subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of one
thousand dollars; except that, for a second or subsequent offense, the fine shall be
five thousand dollars.
31 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-914(a)(l)-(2).
32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-601(l)(b).
3' 773 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
34 Id. at 1277.
31 Id. at 1278.
36 Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
17 Id. at 688.
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Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWhorter,8 found the statutory definition
of "violence" unconstitutionally vague and also restricted the term
"obscene" to sexually explicit materials. The Colorado statute has not
been challenged, and given its limitation to actual violence, may not be.
The thesis of this Article is that the First Amendment should not stand
in the way of attempts to regulate the depiction of violence. Not only may
the FCC and Congress channel the broadcast media's use of violent
material, but Congress may ban it altogether. Likewise, state attempts to
restrict access of minors to violent material also should be held
constitutional. Furthermore, the states should not be limited to controlling
access by minors. States should have the authority to ban completely the
dissemination of excessively violent material.
The insistence by the Supreme Court that for material to be obscene
it must be erotic, is misguided. History and policy provide even better
justification for holding excessively violent material to be outside of the
protection of the First Amendment than they do for withholding such
protection from excessively sexual material. Such violent material should
be unprotected solely due to its violent content, without need for any
inquiry into its sexual content.
The argument is comparative. The position that "Congress shall make
no law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press"39 means
"no law," at least in the context of obscenity, 0 is reasonable, but it has
failed to carry the day. This Article simply argues that if sufficiently
explicit sexual material is not afforded the protection of the First
Amendment, there are equal or better arguments for denying that
protection to excessively violent material.
The Article will first present the Supreme Court's development of the
current law of obscenity and its insistence on eroticism. An examination
of the statutory and case law history used to justify that position then will
show that its adequacy to justify the doctrine is no stronger than statutory
and case law history in favor of a ban on violence. In addition to legal
history within the United States and its predecessor colonies, other legal
and extralegal definitions and concepts of obscenity will be examined. The
Article then shows that the policy reasons commonly offered in support of
banning sexually obscene material provide even better justification for a
ban on excessively violent material. Lastly, the issue of drafting a violent
38 866 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1993).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
0 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-14 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority's test for obscenity is too broad and gives judges
and juries too much discretion to censor).
1994l
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obscenity statute will be addressed with special attention paid to issues
regarding depictions of violence aimed at young children.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ON OBSCENITY, SEX, AND VIOLENCE
The statement that case law and statutory history do not focus solely
on the erotic as obscene clearly would be false, if limited to recent history.
With few exceptions,4' modem obscenity statutes address materials
depicting sexual or excretory activities. Such a theme is, in fact, dictated
by Supreme Court decisions consistently stating that obscenity is so.
limited.
The genesis of constitutional obscenity law is found in Roth v. United
States.42 Although the Court in Roth noted that earlier decisions had
assumed obscene material was not protected by freedom of speech or
freedom of the press,43 in Roth the Court directly addressed the question.
After a consideration of the history of obscenity statutes,44 the Court
concluded that "obscenity is not within the. area of constitutionally
protected speech or press.''
45
The Court then went on to define obscene material as "material which
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. ' 46 The Court
further defined material appealing to the prurient interest as "material
having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts," 47 and "prurient" as
"[i]tching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having
itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity,
lewd .... ,48 The Court said that the resultant formulation was not
significantly different from the Model Penal Code approach, which
classifies material as obscene "if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
41 See infra notes 205-45, 293-337 and accompanying text.
42 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43 Id. at 481 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1953); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931); Hoke v. United States 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913); Public Clearing House
v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897);
United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37
(1877)).
'A See infra notes 56-176 and accompanying text.
15 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
46 Id. at 487 (footnote omitted).
47 Id. at 487 n.20.
48 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1949)).
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candor in description or representation of such matters. ' 49 The Court's
focus on sex and excretion thus was established.
Later cases have been consistent in their application of obscenity
doctrine only to material with a sexual or excretory focus. 50 The insistence
on such content is best seen in Cohen v. California.5' Although the four
letter commentary on the draft displayed on Cohen's jacket may have been
offensive, the Court said that it could not be obscene because "such
[obscene] expression must be, in some significant way, erotic. ' 52
The limitation to sexual material also is seen in the current Miller v.
California53 test of obscenity. Under that test, a finding of obscenity
depends upon:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.54
This Article does not deny that the current focus of obscenity doctrine
is on the depiction of sexual or excretory activities. Rather, the claim is
that such focus, to the exclusion of the consideration of violent material,
is unwarranted. Pre-Roth history provides as good a basis for banning
depictions of violence as obscene as it does for banning depictions of
sexual activities as obscene.
A. The Supreme Court 's History of Obscenity Law as Presented in Roth
In claiming that the historical basis for concluding that excessively
violent material may constitutionally be banned is as good as, or better
than, the historical basis for a ban on sexually explicit material, the test
implied is rather easy to meet. The Court's history, relied upon in Roth,
provides broad, general support for the conclusion reached in that case,
support that does not distinguish sex from violence.
41 Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957)).
5' See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966).
" 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
12 Id. at 20.
53 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
14 Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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The opinion in Roth begins by noting that the freedoms of speech and
the press were never considered absolute and that at the time of the Bill
of Rights, libel could be prosecuted." The Court also cited to statutes on
blasphemy or profanity that predate the Bill of Rights56 and quoted a
Massachusetts statute of the era making it criminal to publish 'any
filthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon' in
imitation or mimicking of religious services."5 7 The Massachusetts statute
was said to show that profanity and obscenity were related offenses. 58 The
claimed showing of such a relation appears to be an attempt to strengthen
the slender reed that a single statute would provide to support a claim that
obscenity was punishable prior to the Bill of Rights. The relationship said
to be found in the Massachusetts statute seems designed to turn the other
statutes and cases cited into obscenity law.
Although the Court did manage to cite statutes from each of the other
twelve colonies and from Vermont, those other statutes and the Ruggles
case from New York did not concern obscenity. Connecticut's Act for the
Punishment of Divers Capital and Other Felonies59 is a blasphemy statute
making it illegal "wilfully to blaspheme the Name of God the Father,
55 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957).
56 See id. at 482 n.12 (citing Act for the Punishment of Divers Capital and Other
Felonies, 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 66, 67; 1737 Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy, §§ 4,
5, 1797 Del. Laws 173, 174; 1786 Act to Regulate Taverns, Digest of the Laws of Ga.
512, 513 (Prince 1822); Act of 1723, ch. 16, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty
1799); 1646.Mass. Bay General Laws & Liberties, ch. XVIII, § 3, 1814 Mass. Bay
Colony Charters & Laws 58; Act of 1782, ch. 8, 1836 Mass. Rev. Stat. 741, § 15; Act
of 1798, ch. 33, §§ 1, 3, 1836 Mass. Rev. Stat. 741, § 16; 1791 Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Not Capital, 1792 N.H. Laws 252, 256; 1791 Act for the Punishment
of Profane Cursing and Swearing, 1792 N.H. Laws 258; 1798 Act for Suppressing Vice
and Immorality, §§ VIII, IX, 1800 N.J. Rev. Laws 329, 331; 1788 Act for Suppressing
Immorality, § IV, 2 N.Y. Laws 257, 258 (Jones & Varick 1777-1789); 1741 Act ... for
the More Effectual Suppression of Vice and Immorality, § III, 1 N.C. Sess. Laws 52
(Martin Rev. 1715-1790); 1700 Act to Prevent the Grievous Sins of Cursing and
Swearing, II Pa. Statutes at Large 49 (1700-1712); 1794 Act for the Prevention of Vice
and Immorality, § II, 3 Pa. Laws 177, 178 (1791-1802); 1798 Act to Reform the Penal
Laws, §§ 33, 34, 1798 R.I. Pub. Laws 584, 595; 1703 Act for the More Effectual
Suppressing of Blasphemy and Prophaneness, 1790 S.C. Laws 4; 1797 Act, for the
Punishment of Certain Capital, and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors, § 20, 1 Vt.
Laws 332, 339 (Tolman 1808); 1797 Act, for the Punishment of Certain Inferior Crimes
and Misdemeanors, § 20, 1 Vt. Laws 352, 361 (Tolman 1808); 1792 Act for the Effectual
Suppression of Vice, § 1, 1794 Va. Acts 286); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y.
1811).
" Id. at 483 (quoting 1712 Mass. Bay Acts & Laws, ch. CV, § 8, 1814 Mass. Bay
Colony Charters & Laws 39).
58 id.
'9 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 66, 67.
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Son, or Holy Ghost, either by denying, cursing or reproaching the true God
or his Government of the World."'6
Delaware's An Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy; and to Prevent
the Grevious Sins of Prophane Cursing, Swearing and Blasphemy61 might
appear from its title's inclusion of profanity to be more on point, but it too
was aimed at preserving sanctity, of government as well as of religion.
Section four made it illegal for "any person within this government...
prophanely [to] swear, by the name of God, Jesus Christ, or the Holy
Spirit, or curse himself or any other person."62 Section five, not so limited
to members of the Government, punished blasphemy by the pillory,
branding on the forehead, and thirty-nine lashes.63
Georgia's statute was less specific in the nature of the profanity it
barred. Its An Act to Regulate Taverns, and to Suppress Vice and
Immorality' imposed fines against anyone taking a profane oath or trading
with slaves without a permit.
The Maryland statute again shows the colonial concern with
blasphemy. Illegal under the act was:
blaspheming or cursing God, or . . .denying our Saviour
Jesus Christ to be the son of God, or denying the Holy
Trinity, or the Godhead of any of the Three Persons, or of
the Unity of the Godhead, or ...uttering any profane
words concerning the Holy Trinity or any of the persons
thereof . *...65
Penalties ranged from fine or imprisonment on the first offense, the
addition of a forehead brand on the second, to death, without benefit of
clergy, on the third offense.66
In addition to the Massachusetts law using the word "obscene," the
Court cited three other Massachusetts statutes. The first, titled Blasphemy,
made it illegal to:
blaspheme the holy name of God, Father, Son, or Holy
Ghost, with direct, presumptuous, or high handed blas-
phemy, either by wilful or obstinate denying the true God,
60 id.
61 1 Del. Laws 173, 174 (1797).
62 Id. § 4.
63 Id. § 5.
6' Digest of the Laws of Ga. 512, 513 (Prince 1822).
65 Act of 1723, ch. 16, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799).
66 Id.
1994]
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or his creation, or government of the world, or ... curse
God in like manner, or reproach the holy religion of God,
as if it were but a politick device ... or ... utter any other
kind of blasphemy of the like nature and degree ....
The focus again is clearly on the protection of religious sensibilities. Other
sections prohibit idolatry and witchcraft, and the penalty for violation is
death.68 Interestingly, the citations of authority accompanying the various
sections are all biblical. 69 Again there is no indication that the statute is
aimed at the depiction of sexual acts.
The second statute, titled An Act Against Blasphemy,70 is once again
clearly aimed at the protection of religion. The statute does address cursing
but only bars cursing God, Jesus Christ, or the Holy Ghost. 71 Further
banned is exposing to contempt and ridicule any of the books, all
presented by name in the statute, of the Old or New Testament.
The last Massachusetts statute cited would appear from its title, An Act
to Prevent Profane Cursing and Swearing, to be of more general
application and perhaps more closely related to obscenity. However, the
act states as its justification that:
the horrible practice of profane Cursing and Swearing is
inconsistent with the dignity & rational cultivation of the
human mind, with a due reverence of the Supreme Being
and his Providence, & hath a natural tendency to weaken
the solemnity and obligation of Oaths lawfully taken in the
administration of Justice; to promote falsehood, perjuries,
blasphemies, and the dissoluteness of manners, and to
73loosen the bonds of civil society ....
The focus of the statute seems far removed from the obscene, and aimed
not at swearing and cursing in the modern sense, but rather at invoking the
name of God in a curse or in an unlawfully taken oath.
Two New Hampshire statutes, adopted within a week of each other in
1791, also are cited. The first is titled An Act for the Punishment of
67 1646 Mass. Bay General Laws & Liberties, ch. XVIII, § 3, 1814 Mass. Bay Colony
Charters & Laws 58.
68 Id. §§ 1, 2.
69 Id. § 3.
" Act of 1782, ch. 8, 1836 Mass. Rev. Stat. 741, § 15.
71 id.
72 Act of 1798, ch. 33, §§ 1, 3, 1836 Mass. Rev. Stat. 741, § 16.
73 Id.
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Certain Crimes Not Capital.74 The Act contains a prohibition against libel
and an additional prohibition against denying the existence of God,
blaspheming the name of God, Jesus Christ, or the Holy Ghost. 75 It further
bars cursing or reproaching the word of God as contained in the Old and
New Testaments, once again reciting the names of the books of the Bible.76
The second statute, like the third of the Massachusetts statutes, bans
profane swearing and cursing.77 Unlike the Massachusetts statute, however,
the explicit focus on using the name of God or unlawfully swearing is not
present. The statute simply imposes a fine, imprisonment for one hour, or
ten lashes on any person who "shall profanely curse or Swear.'' 78 The
capitalization of "Swear" may indicate a formal oath, but there is no
such hint of a limitation on the meaning of "curse" to religion, unless
"profane" is taken to provide such a focus. 7 9 Nor, however, is there any
indication that the statute is aimed at obscenity, and the statute provides
no support for such a ban, other than as supporting the proposition that not
all speech is absolutely protected. Certainly, there is no support for
the Roth limitation of obscenity law to sexual and excretory activities. The
general proposition that not all speech is absolutely protected, which the
statute supports, provides equal support for a ban on depictions of
violence.
The aim of the first of the two sections cited from New Jersey's law8"
is unclear. Section eight of the Act for Suppressing Vice and Immorality
provides a half-dollar fine for profane swearing or cursing. Although
supporting the proposition that not all speech was protected at the time of
the Bill of Rights,8' the section certainly does not focus on sexually
explicit speech. Further, it provides no support for a distinction between
depictions of sex and depictions of violence. The animus behind section
nine is more clear. It is designed to protect the dignity of the judicial
process by punishing profane swearing or cursing in the presence of a
justice of the peace, while in the execution of the office of the justice of
the peace.82
14 1792 N.H. Laws 252, 256.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 258.
78 Id.
79 Professor Tribe derives "profane" from "in front of a temple." See infra note
211 and accompanying text.
80 1798 Act for Suppressing Vice and Immorality, §§ VIII, IX, 1800 N.J. Rev. Laws
329, 331.
81 Id. § 8.
82 id. § 9.
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Like the first section cited from New Jersey, the New York statute
simply imposed a fine, this time of three shillings, on anyone profanely
swearing or cursing.83 Roth also cites a New York case in footnote twelve.
Since the case is post-Bill of Rights, its relevance in the portion of Roth
in which it appears can only be as an explanation of the pre-Bill of Rights
statute cited. People v. Ruggles84 upheld the criminal conviction of an
individual who loudly proclaimed to a large crowd that "Jesus Christ was
a bastard, and his mother must be a whore. ' 85 The charge was blasphemy,
and the court determined that the First Amendment, while protecting
discussion of religious views, did not protect blasphemy.86 Once again,
there is no support provided for obscenity laws, other than the general
claim that not all speech is protected, and no basis for a distinction
between sexual obscenity and violent obscenity is provided.
The North Carolina statute is less clearly focused on the protection of
religion. The cited section, section III of An Act for the Better Observation
and Keeping of the Lord's Day, Commonly Called Sunday, and for the
More Effectual Suppression of Vice and Immorality,87 prohibits profane
swearing or cursing, with increased penalties for public officers so doing.
In addition to a possible religious connotation to "profane," the previous
section of the statute, as indicated in the title, prohibits work on the
"Lord's day" so that people can "carefully apply themselves to the
Duties of Religion and Piety."' 88 Other sections are directed to swearing
and cursing in court and to being drunk on Sunday.89 The focus appears
to be upon the protection of religious practice and the maintenance of
religious, judicial, and perhaps public, dignity. The statute again provides
no basis for Roth's insistence that obscenity is limited to sexual depictions.
Both of the Pennsylvania statutes cited also are aimed at the protection
of religion. The first, An Act to Prevent the Grievous Sins of Cursing and
Swearing,9" punishes by fine or imprisonment any person who "shall
willfully, premeditatedly... blaspheme or speak loosely and Profanely of
Almighty God, or Christ Jesus, or the Holy Spirit, or the Scriptures of
Truth .... "91 The second, An Act for the Prevention of Vice and
13 1788 Act for Suppressing Immorality, § IV, 2 N.Y. Laws 257, 258 (Jones & Varick
1777-1789).
84 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811).
85 Id. at 292.
86 Id.
17 1 N.C. Laws 52 (Martin Rev. 1715-1790).
88 Id. § II.
'9 Id. §§ IV, V.
90 1 Pa. Statutes at Large 49 (1700-1712).
91 Id.
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Immorality,92 at section II similarly punishes "any person of the age of
sixteen years upwards [who] shall profanely curse or swear by the name
of God, Christ Jesus, or the Holy Ghost .. .
The Rhode Island statutes cited contain a section imposing a penalty
of up to one hundred dollars fine and two months imprisonment for
blasphemy, and a section prohibiting profane cursing and swearing upon
pain of a fifty cent to one dollar fine for a first offense.94 Again the aim
of the profane cursing and swearing section is unclear. It does support the
proposition that not all speech was protected, but it may focus on religion
and certainly does not support a conclusion that sexual speech was not
protected, while violence was.
The title alone of the South Carolina statute cited by the Court, An Act
for the More Effectual Suppressing of Blasphemy and Prophaneness,95 is
enough to indicate its purpose. The Act recites its concern with those who
"openly avowed and published many blasphemous and impious Opinions,
contrary to the Doctrines and Principles of the Christian Religion, greatly
tending to the Dishonour of Almighty God .... 9' It makes illegal to
"deny any one of the persons of the Holy Trinity to be God, or ... assert
or maintain there are more Gods than one, or .. .deny the christian
religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament
to be of Divine Authority .... ,9 Interestingly, the statute applied only
to those educated in the Christian religion or having professed the
Christian religion within South Carolina.
The Court cited two Vermont statutes. The first, Act, for the
Punishment of Certain Capital, and Other High Crimes and Misdemean-
ors, at section twenty made it illegal to "publicly deny the being and
existence of God, or of the Supreme Being [or] contumeliously reproach
his providence, and government. 99 The statute clearly was aimed at the
protection of religion. The second, Act, for the Punishment of Certain
Inferior Crimes and Misdemeanors,' o forbade profane swearing or cursing.
Again, a link to religion might be drawn from the use of "profane," but
the context of the statute in a collection of sections regarding public
disturbances and obstructing public proclamations makes it appear aimed
9' 3 Pa. Laws 177, 178 (1791-1802).
93 Id.
9' 1798 Act to Reform the Penal Laws, §§ 33, 34, 1798 R.I. Pub. Laws 584, 595.
95 1790 S.C. Laws 4.
96 id.
97 id.
98 1 Vt. Laws 332, 339 (Tolman 1808).
99 Id.
'00 Id. at 352, 361.
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at keeping the public peace. In either case, it provides no support for a
distinction between sexual and violent obscenity.
Lastly, the Virginia statute' l' cited prohibited profane swearing or
cursing on pain of an eighty-three cent fine for each offense or ten lashes,
if unable to pay.' °2 The statute appears-aimed at the general maintenance
of public dignity, as shown by the fact that it also prohibited drunkenness,
imposing the same penalty. 0 3
The only statute actually quoted by the Court was one of the
Massachusetts statutes. °n Interestingly, even that statute does not support,
as a general proposition, the claim that obscenity and profanity legally
were related. The only relationship present in the statute is that neither
obscenity nor profanity could be used in any 'song, pamphlet, libel or
mock sermon' in imitation or mimicking of religious services."'0 5 The
context is interesting given the history of censorship as more concerned
with the protection of religion than with the suppression of sexual
materials. 0 6 A statute criminalizing the use of either in mimicry of religion
does not equate the two and does not help in defining the concept of
obscenity.
The second step in Roth's journey through history is the claim that
"[a]t the time of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was
not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently contemporane-
ous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection
intended for speech and press."' 1 7 All of the statutes and cases cited,
however, are later than'the adoption of the Bill of Rights,'0 8 and even the
characterization of some of the statutes and cases as concerning obscenity,
at least in the modern Court's definition of the concept,'0 9 is suspect."0
'01 1792 Act for the Effectual Suppression of Vice, § 1, 1794 Va. Acts 286.
102 id.
103 Id.
" See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
'o' Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (citing 1712 Mass. Bay Acts and Laws, ch. CV, § 8, 1814
Mass. Bay Colony Charters & Laws 39).
106 See infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
107 Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (citing 1821 Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, § 69,
1824 Conn. Stat. Laws 109; Knowles v. State, 3 Day (Conn.) 103 (1808); 1835 Rev. Stat.,
ch. 130, § 10, 1836 Mass. Rev. Stat. 740; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335
(1821); 1842 Rev. Stat., ch. 113, § 2, 1843 N.H. Rev. Stat. 221; 1798 Act for Suppressing
Vice and Immorality, § XII, 1800 N.J. Rev. Laws 329, 331; Commonwealth v. Sharpless,
2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815)).
108 id.
"o See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
I0 See infra notes 111-202 and accompanying text.
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The earliest statute cited is New Jersey's Act for Suppressing Vice and
Immorality;"' however, that statute is not aimed at erotic material. Much
more broadly, it bans from the "public stage . ... or other place whatever,
any interludes, farces or plays of any kind, or any games, tricks, juggling,
slight of hand, or feats of uncommon dexterity and agility of body, or any
bear :baiting or bull baiting, or any such like shews or exhibitions
whatsoever . . 2 The statute never uses the word ''obscenity,' nor
does it make any reference to material of a sexual nature. The closest it
comes -to such a reference is in stating the legislature's concerns about the
corruption -of the morals of youth, along with concerns over bringing
together idle persons, impoverishing families, gratifying "useless
curiosity," and generally serving "no good or useful purpose in
society.""' 3 The concern about the corruption of youthful morals as one
of so many concerns, and the attempt to ban most exhibitions rather than
a focus on the erotic, provides little support for the claim that there were
contemporaneous obscenity statutes." 4 It provides no justification for the
Court's insistence that obscenity be limited to the depictions of sexual or
excretory acts.
The next earliest statute cited is Connecticut's Act Concerning Crimes
and Punishments."5 The statute is an obscenity statute in that it makes it
illegal to "print, import, publish, sell, or distribute, any book, pamphlet,
ballad, or other printed paper, containing obscene language, prints or
descriptions .... 16 The statute itself, however, provides no support for
the Court's later limitation of obscenity to the erotic or even for the
conclusion that obscenity includes the erotic. Furthermore, the 1821 date
of the statute makes it something less than contemporaneous to the Bill of
Rights.
The third statute, from Massachusetts, dates from 1835. The chapter,
titled Of Offences Against Chastity, Morality, and Decency,' " contained a
section prohibiting the sale, distribution or publication of "any book, or
any pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, or other thing, containing obscene
language, or obscene prints, pictures, figures, or descriptions, manifestly
1800 N.J. Rev. Laws 329, 331.
12 Id. § XII. The statute did allow the exhibition of natural curiosities and of plays
found by three justices of the peace to be innocent and of useful end. Id.
113 id.
114 If "obscene" means off-stage or not allowed to be shown on the stage, see infra
notes 341-45, 359-80 and accompanying text, then the statute would be an obscenity
statute in that it bans certain material from the stage. Once again, however, there is no
basis in the statute for the conclusion that the statute was aimed at erotic material.
15 1821 Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, § 69, 1824 Conn. Stat. Laws 109.
116 id.
"1 1835 Rev. Stat., ch. 130, § 10, 1836 Mass. Rev. Stat. 740.
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tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.""' Once again, it is not
clear that the erotic is obscene, although the inclusion of "chastity"
within the chapter title may be seen as providing weak support for that
conclusion. While the corruption of youth might include material exposing
youth to the erotic, that conclusion is not clear from the statute.' 19
Furthermore, there is no reason to limit the materials that might corrupt the
morals of youth to the erotic.
The latest of the "sufficiently contemporaneous" statutes cited was
from the Of Offences Against the Police of Towns chapter of the New
Hampshire statutes. 2 ° The statute dates from 1842, and its relevance to the
Bill of Rights is questionable. It does, however, provide some insight into
what was obscene in its time. The statute provides that
[n]o person shall sing or repeat, or cause to be sung or
repeated any lewd, obscene or profane song, or shall repeat
any lewd, obscene or profane words; or write or mark in
any manner any obscene or profane word, or obscene or
lascivious figure or representation on any building, fence,
wall, post or any other thing whatever.' 2'
The use of "lewd" and "lascivious" in the statute might be taken as a
focus on the erotic. It also should be noted, however, that the statute may
not provide much support for general bans on the obscene. The chapter
containing the section concerned public nuisances, and the section itself
addresses public recitation or posting, rather than banning the material
itself. 122
As with the statutes, the cases cited strengthen in support only as they
become less contemporaneous. The earliest of the cases is Knowles v.
State.'23 Knowles was convicted of violating Connecticut's restrictions on
plays and public performances by displaying a "horrid and unnatural
monster."'24 The description offered of the monster in question fails to
match any contemporary views on obscenity:
118 Id.
19 Other contemporaneous uses of the word "obscene" would provide insight into
its meaning within the statute, but the definition of "obscene" in the era is not as clear
as might be expected. See infra notes 246-88 and accompanying text.
120 1842 Rev. Stat., ch. 113, § 2, 1843 N.H. Rev. Stat. 221.
121 id.
122 id.
123 3 Day 103 (Conn. 1808).
124 Id. at 103.
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And the head of said monster, represented by said picture,
resembles that of an African, but the features of the face are
indistinct: there are apertures for eyes, but no eyes; his chin
projects considerably, and the ears are placed unnaturally
back, on or near the neck; its fore legs, by said picture, are
here represented to lie on its breast, nearly in the manner of
human arms; its skin is smooth, without hair, and of dark,
tawny, or copper colour.
25
Knowles' conviction was reversed, with the court holding that his
exhibition was not within the scope of the statute. 126 The court did,
however, accept the proposition that "[e]very public show and exhibition,
which outrages decency, shocks humanity, or is contrary to good morals,
is punishable at common law."' 127 Even under the common law, the
conviction could not stand for failure of the information to "particularly
state the circumstances in which the indecency, barbarity or immorality,
consists." 128
This case lends little support for the Court's position in Roth. It does
support the proposition that, at common law, though somewhat after the
Bill of Rights, some material could be kept from the stage. Its broad
language of "outrag[ing] decency," "shock[ing] humanity," being
"contrary to good morals," and "barbarity" provides little specificity
as to what could be the subject of such a ban. Particularly, the reference
to "barbarity" would belie a sole focus on sexual or excretory
activities.
The second of the cases cited in Roth is to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's 1815 decision in Commonwealth v. Sharpless."2 9 Sharpless was
charged with exhibiting:
a certain lewd, wicked, scandalous, infamous and obscene
painting, representing a man in an obscene, impudent, and
indecent posture with a woman, to the manifest corruption
and subversion of youth, and other citizens of this
commonwealth, to the evil example of all others in like
case offending, and against the peace and dignity of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 30
125 id.
126 Id. at 107.
127 Id. at 108.
128 id.
129 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815).
30 Id. at 91-92.
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The exhibition was not as public as that in Knowles, having occurred
inside a house, but it was public in the sense that the painting was shown
to a paying public audience.13 1 It also appears from the charge that the
objection to the material focused on its sexual nature. 132
Chief Justice Tilghman could find no statute contrary to the
defendant's acts, but he opined that acts of public indecency were
indictable as corrupting public morality.1 33 That which corrupts society was
said to be indictable as a breach of the peace.'34 Justice Yeates also
stressed that that which leads to the destruction of morality in general is
punishable under the common law. "The corruption of the public mind,
in general, and debauching the manners of youth, in particular, by lewd
and obscene pictures exhibited to view, must necessarily be attended with
the most injurious consequences, and in such instances, courts of justice
are, or ought to be, the schools of morals."'
' 35
Sharpless does provide support for the proposition that obscenity was
punishable in 1815, at least in Pennsylvania. The 1815 date is, of course,
after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Although the time span may not
be terribly great, that the Court had to go so far into the future to find
isolated cases supporting the proposition that obscenity was punishable
calls into question the relevance of those cases to the law at the time of
the adoption of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, it is unclear that Sharpless should be taken as supporting
the position that obscenity is limited to sexual or excretory activities.
While the painting exhibited by Sharpless may have been sexual in its
content, the language of the opinion is broader. That which "corrupt[s]
public morality" or "corrupts society" or leads to "[t]he corruption of
the public mind" was said to be punishable. 36 Although the sexual
material at issue was held to fall within that category, the opinion does not
state that exhibitions depicting other subjects cannot also come within the
category, and the broad language used may be taken to allow a wider
scope to obscenity law.
13 Id. at 91.
132 Id.
13 Id. at 101. Chief Justice Tilghman relied on the English conviction of Sir Charles
Sedley for standing naked on a balcony in London. Although the Chief Justice recognized
that Sir Charles also had thrown down bottles of urine on the crowd below, he concluded
that the conviction rested primarily on his "exposure of his person." Id. This reading
of the case may be questioned, see infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text, and in any
case, simple nudity would not fit current definitions of obscenity.
114 Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle at 102.
115 Id. at 103 (Yeates, J., concurring).
136 Id. (Yeates, J., concurring).
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Much of what was said of Sharpless also may be said of the last of the
cases cited, the 1821 Massachusetts case Commonwealth v. Holmes.137 The
Holmes case was based on the publication of.a "lewd and obscene print"
contained in the book Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure.38 The objections
to the book and print appear to arise out of their sexual nature, although
the issues on appeal were the jurisdiction of the lower court and the
sufficiency of the indictment. 39 The court's opinion rejecting the claims
on appeal might be read to assume that sufficiently offending sexual
material may be banned as obscene, again well after the Bill of Rights.
Nothing in the opinion, however, supports a claim that the category of the
obscene is so limited to such material.
The Roth opinion also cited several Supreme Court opinions that
demonstrate that the "Court has always assumed that obscenity is not
protected by the freedoms of speech and press."' 4 ° The cases date from
1877 to 1953, falling somewhat short of having "always assumed that
obscenity is not protected," particularly from the point of view of
constitutionally relevant eras. Furthermore, most of the references to
obscenity are dicta and none make any effort to define obscenity,
particularly with any limitation to sexual or excretory activities to the
exclusion of depictions of violence.
..Several of the cases concerned regulation of the mails and interstate
commerce. Ex Parte Jackson'4' held constitutional a federal statute pro-
hibiting using the mails for lottery advertisements, while noting that the act
also prohibits mailing obscene materials.'42 United States v. Chase4 3 again
held constitutional the same statute, but excluded private letters in plain
envelopes from the definition of obscene writing.'44 Public Clearing House
v. Coyne'45 also had to do with bans on mailing obscene materials and held
that the Postmaster's refusal to deliver such materials did not violate due
137 17 Mass. 335 (1821).
138 id.
131 Id. at 336.
'40 Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 (citing Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1953);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S.
146, 158 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U:S. 568, 571-72-(1942); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Hoke v. United States 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913);
Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275, 281 (1897); United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890); Ex Parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877)).
141 96 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877).
142 Id. at 737.
143 135 U.S. 255, 261 (1890).
'44 Id. at 262.
141 194 U.S. 497, 508 (1904).
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process." Hoke "v. United States'47 included regulation of obscene
materials along with regulation of prostitution as within Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce.'48 Lastly, Hanne'gan v. Esquire, Inc.
149
again accepted limitations on mailing obscene materials. 15 °
Other cases mentioned limitations on obscene materials in arguing for
or against other limitations on constitutional rights. Robertson v. Bald-
win'51 merely mentioned limits on obscene material as an exception to the
Bill of Rights in ruling on the constitutionality of involuntarily returning
deserting merchant marines to their ships. Near v. Minnesota, 52 in
disapproving prior restraints on the press, noted that there may be
prohibitions on publishing obscene materials. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,53 in holding that fighting words were without first amendment
protection, included obscenity and profanity as also unprotected. Beau-
harnais v. Illinois,154 in its discussion of group libel, said that no one
contends that obscene speech only can be punished if it presents a clear
and present danger.
Most interesting among the cases cited is Winters v. New York. 15' The
cite was to a portion of the opinion noting that, while value in speech may
not be required for protection, if material is obscene or profane, it may be
controlled. What makes the cite interesting, however, is that the statute,
under which the material at issue was argued to be obscene, focused not
on sexual or excretory activities, but on crime and violence.'
5 6
The Roth Court also cited cases reviewing convictions under federal
obscenity law. 157 Those cases, dating from 1895 to 1932, all held
constitutional prohibitions on the use of the mails for shipping obscene
materials. One of the cases cited, Swearingen v. United States,58 is of
particular importance. It is this 1896 case that has been cited as the first
'4 Id. at 516.
147 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
148 Id. at 323.
149 327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946).
150 Id.
' ' 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
152 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
'15 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
154 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1953).
"1 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
156 See infra notes 205-21 and accompanying text.
117 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 481 n.9 (citing United States v. Limehouse, 285 U.S. 424
(1932); Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427 (1913); Price v. United States, 165 U.S.
311 (1897); Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897); Rosen v. United States 161
U.S. 29 (1896); Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896); Andrews v. United
States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895)).
1s 161 U.S. 446 (1896).
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American case in which it became clear that obscenity had developed an
exclusive focus on sexual activities.
159
The Roth opinion also notes, in support of its conclusion that obscene
material merits no first amendment protection, twenty federal obscenity
laws enacted between 1842 and 1956."6 As with the state statutes and the
case law cited, the older the federal statute the less clear the focus. The
1842 enactment barred the importation of "indecent and obscene" prints,
paintings, lithographs, engravings, and transparencies.1 6' The 1857 statute
amended the 1842 statute to include articles, images, figures, daguerreo-
types, and photographs. 162 Neither statute defined "obscene" or
"indecent." Nor did either establish a basis for distinguishing sexual
obscenity from violent obscenity.
The next federal statute was enacted in 1865. It barred from the mails
"obscene" books, pamphlets, pictures, and prints,- along with other
"vulgar and indecent" publications. 6 3 The 1872 statute added printed or
engraved "disloyal devices" and envelopes or postal cards with
"scurrilous epithets" to the items not to be mailed. 64 Again, no
definitions are provided, and the language-"vulgar" and "scurri-
lous"-may go beyond depictions of sexual activity.
The first federal general criminal statute that went beyond the mails or
importation was enacted in 1873.165 The statute applied in the District of
Columbia, territories, and other areas within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States. 66 It banned distribution, exhibition, or advertisement
of any "obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular,
print, picture, drawing or other representation, figure, or image . . . or
other article of an immoral nature, or any drug or medicine, or any article
whatever, for the prevention of conception, or for causing unlawful
abortion ... 167 The statute also amended the 1872 statute to bar from
159 See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
" Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (citing 70 Stat. 699 (1956); 69 Stat. 183 (1955); 64 Stat. 451
(1950); 64 Stat. 194 (1950); 62 Stat. 768 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1460-1469 (1988 & Supp. 1992)); 48 Stat. 1091, 1100 (1934); 46 Stat. 688 (1930); 41
Stat. 1060 (1920); 35 Stat. 1129, 1138 (1909); 33 Stat. 705 (1905); 29 Stat. 512 (1897);
26 Stat. 567, 614-15 (1890); 25 Stat. 496 (1888); 25 Stat. 187, 188 (1888); 19 Stat. 90
(1876); 17 Stat. 598 (1873); 17 Stat. 302 (1872);- 13 Stat. 504, 507 (1865); 11 Stat. 168
(1857); 5 Stat. 548, 566 (1842)).
161 5 Stat. 548, 566 (1842).
162 11 Stat. 168 (1857).
163 13 Stat. 504, 507 (1865).
'64 17 Stat. 302 (1872).
165 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
166 id.
167 id.
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the mails the objects banned in federal territories. 168 Again, no definition
is provided; however, that portion of the statute amending the 1872 statute
adds "lewd, or lascivious" to "obscene" as adjectives describing the
items banned. 169 That language may indicate the beginning of a focus on
sex. Further, the concern over contraception may provide some additional,
though weak, evidence for such a focus.
The 1876 statute simply amended the 1872 statute to increase the
penalties, 70 but the first 1888 statute cited in Roth increased the scope of
mail bans. It barred misrepresenting the contents of mail and further
declared unmailable anything in an envelope or wrapper "upon which
indecent, lewd, lascivious, obscene, libelous, scurrilous, or threatening
delineations, epithets, terms, or language, or reflecting injuriously upon the
character or conduct of another, may be written or printed . . . ,171' The
second 1888 statute amended the first 1888 statute and the 1872 statute in
minor ways. 7 2
The 1890 statute cited in Roth again addressed importation, barring the
same sorts of objects whose distribution was declared illegal in the 1873
statute.173 The statute also addressed federal government employees aiding
or abetting in violations of federal law prohibiting distribution, advertise-
ment, exhibition, or mailing the same sorts of objects. 174 The 1897 statute
extended the mail bans to private express companies and common
carriers, 75 and the 1905 statute amended the 1897 statute to include a ban
on exportation of such materials from the United States, its territories, and
the District of Columbia. 76
The first 1909 statute adds "filthy" and "vile" to "obscene, lewd,
or lascivious" in describing the materials banned from the mails-materials
similar to those banned in the 1888 and 1890. statutes.17 7 The addition of
the new adjectives might signal a heightened focus on sexual materials, but
need not have that connotation. 78 The second 1909 statute was a minor
amendment to the exportation statute, 179 and the 1920 statute reflected
168 id.
169 id.
170.19 Stat. 90(1876).
17' 25 Stat. 187, 188 (1888).
172 25 Stat. 496 (1888).
173 26 Stat. 567, 614-15 (1890); see supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
174 id.
'75 29 Stat. 512 (1897).
176 33 Stat. 705 (1905).
177 35 Stat. 1129 (1909).
178 See infra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
179 35 Stat. 1129, 1138 (1909).
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technological change in adding "filthy" motion pictures to the banned
"filthy" books, pamphlets, and pictures of several earlier statutes. 80
The Tariff Act of 19308' added seditious materials and lottery tickets
to items that could not be imported, while maintaining the ban on
"obscene or immoral" materials., 82 Although still providing no definition
of "obscene," the statute does begin to reflect the view that even obscene
materials may have worth. It provided that "the Secretary of the Treasury
may, in his discretion, admit the so-called classics or books of recognized
and established literary or scientific merit, but may, in his discretion, admit
such classics or books only. when imported 
-for noncommercial
purposes.""'
The next two cited statutes, parts of the Communications Act of
1934, 184 also reflect technological innovation, banning "obscene, indecent,
or profane language" from the airways 185 and setting penalties for such
broadcast. 86
The 1948 statute is particularly interesting. The statute codified a
portion of the 1909 statute discussed above,'87 , under the title Mailing
obscene or crime-inciting matter, and added that the term "indecent"
includes matter that would tend to incite arson, murder, or assassination.'88
Although the section title did distinguish between "obscene" and
"crime-inciting," perhaps showing that by the 1940s the two categories
were distinct, the inclusion of crime-inciting material as indecent calls into
question any sole focus on sex in the earlier statutes.
The three remaining statutes have little to add. The first 1950 statute
cited added phonograph records, electrical transcriptions, and other sound
recordings to the categories of objects that may be obscene within the
1948 statute.' 89 The second 1950 statute increased the powers of the
Postmaster General with regard to mailings of "obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy, or vile" materials. 90 Lastly, the 1955 statute amended the
1948 statute in ways that cast no new light on the definition of
180 41 Stat. 1060 (1920).
' 46 Stat. 688 (1930).
182 id.
183 id.
184 48 Stat. 1091 (1934).
185 id.
186 48 Stat. 1100 (1934).
187 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
188 62 Stat. 768 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-1469 (1988 &
Supp. 1992)).
189 64 Stat. 194 (1950).
190 64 Stat. 451 (1950).
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"obscene.""' The definition of "indecent" as including material tending
to incite arson, murder, or assassination remained, and in fact still
remains. 19
2
The Court's reliance in Roth on federal statutes does little to provide
a definition for obscenity. At best, weak support for a sole focus on sexual
depictions is found in the use of terms such as "lewd," "lascivious,"
"filthy," and "indecent" in some of the statutes. At least one line of
statutes, however, included crime-inciting material within the indecent. 193
Lacking any statutory definitions of "obscene," the statutes must be
interpreted in the context of obscenity cases and the common meaning of
the word. The case law shows a development in which "obscene" does
take on the focus that the Court finds, but at a date later than any that
would be of constitutional significance. 194 Common usage provides no
better basis for the Court's conclusion. Indeed, it is not clear even at
present that the use of "obscene" should be so limited. 95
The last source to which the Court turned in support for its denial of
protection to obscene materials was international sentiment. The Court said
that its rejection of protection for obscene materials "is mirrored in the
universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in
the international agreement of over 50 nations . '. .. 9' The authority that
the opinion cites appears to be a 1956 treaty, which would be weak
support for the constitutionality of obscenity bans. A 1956 treaty would
show only the international climate at the time of Roth rather than at any
more constitutionally relevant time. The treaty, however, has a longer
pedigree, dating from the Agreement for the Repression of the Circulation
of Obscene Publications, in force since 191 .'9 Even that earlier date is,
of course, after any dates of constitutional importance, and the treaty
shows only the modem era's willingness to ban obscene publications.
Although the international willingness to ban depictions of violence has
not taken treaty form, some foreign countries have suppressed such
'9' 69 Stat. 183 (1955).
'92 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988).
,' See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
'94 See infra note 291 and accompanying text.
195 See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
'96 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (citing Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of
Obscene Publications, 37 Stat. 1511 (1911); Treaties in Force 209 (Oct. 31, 1956)).
197 Agreement for the Repression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, May 4,
1910, 37 Stat. 1511 (1911). Although the treaty speaks of obscene materials, without
defining such materials either explicitly or implicitly, the focus of obscenity on the
sexually explicit occurred prior to the date of the treaty, see infra note 288 and
accompanying text, and it would seem reasonable to limit the scope of the treaty to such
materials.
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materials. For example, the 1950s importation into Great Britain of
American horror comics led to a ban on books and magazines mainly
containing stories told in pictures and depicting crime, violence, cruelty,
or repulsive or horrible incidents, if they were likely to fall into the hands
of youths and would tend to corrupt such young persons.'9 Interestingly,
the definition of young persons, for the purposes of the statute, ran to a
slightly older age than would allow admission to a sexually explicit
film.
199
In the same era, New Zealand showed concerns over the corruption of
its youth by American horror comics. New Zealand established registration
and licensing requirements for publishers and required compliance with
indecency laws as a condition for a license.2° Indecency, for purposes of
the statute, encompassed not only sexually explicit material but also ma-
terial that "unduely emphasizes ... horror, crime, cruelty or violence. ' 20 '
While the licensing system was later repealed, the impetus for that repeal
seemed to have been concern over chilling effects rather than a
reconsideration of the propriety of banning horror or crime comics. 20 2
Legal bans on works depicting violence may not be very widespread.
The relevance of the treaty on sexual obscenity, however, remains unclear.
It certainly would appear irrelevant to the Constitution. While the meaning
of "obscene" in eras of constitutional relevance is important, any
developing consensus in the 1900s is irrelevant. Beyond its irrelevance, the
claim may even be questionable. The United States has struggled with
what should be considered obscene. Even the general Anglo-American
focus of obscenity on sex did not become clear until the late 1800s.2 °3 The
surety with which the conclusion can be drawn that such a focus also
existed in other signatory nations at the time of the treaty is diminished by
translation difficulties associated with such a complex concept and the
development of a focus in those countries.
B. The Supreme Court s Treatment of Media Depictions of Violence
If post-Bill of Rights, and indeed post-Fourteenth Amendment, statutes
banning sexual obscenity are to provide justification for the constitutional-
198 DAVID H. TRIBE, QUESTIONS OF CENSORSHIP 82-83 (1973).
,9 Id. at 83.
200 Indecent Publications Amendment Act, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1171 (1954).
201 id.
202 For a discussion of New Zealand's treatment of the subject, see Charlotte L.
Bynum, Feminism and Pornography: A New Zealand Perspective, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1131
(1991).
203 See infra note 288 and accompanying text.
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ity of such a ban, °4 there are two Supreme Court cases involving violence
that deserve consideration. The two cases, and the insight they contain into
the statutory climate of the era, provide equal justification for a ban on
excessively violent material.
The first case is Winters v. New York.2 °5 Winters is the appeal of a
conviction for possession with intent to sell the :magazine Headquarters
Detective, True Cases from the Police Blotter.2 °6 The conviction was
obtained under a statutory section making it illegal "to sell ... any book,
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the
publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or
accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed,
lust or crime . . ,.0. Interestingly, despite the focus of the statute on
violence and crime, although also including lust, the section was titled
"Obscene prints and articles."
20 8
The statute in question originally had been enacted to protect minors
from exposure to such violent material but later had been amended to
include other audiences. 2 9 The New York Court of Appeals also had
narrowed the statute through construction. The New York court noted that
"collections of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust 'can be so massed as
to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the
person and in that case such publications are indecent or obscene in an
admissible sense .... "'210 and limited application to such material. The
state court was concerned that the statute not be read to 'outlaw all
commentaries on crime from detective tales to scientific treatises' on the
ground that the legislature did not intend such literalness of
'04 See supra notes 55-203 and accompanying text; see infra notes 205-88 and
accompanying text.
205 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
206 Id. at 508 n.1.
207 NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 1141 (Consol. 1938).
Obscene prints and articles
1. A person.., who,
2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has in
his possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise
offers for sale, loan, gift or distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper
or other printed paper devoted to the publication, and principally made up of
criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories
of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime;
Is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
208 'Id
209 Winters, 333 U.S. at 511 (citing 1884 N.Y. Laws 380; 1887 N.Y. Laws 692; 1941
N.Y. Laws 925).
210 Id. at 513 (quoting People v. Winters, 63 N.E,2d 98, 100 (1945)).
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construction. 2 . The court also left open the question of whether the
statute applied to material that did not focus on bloodshed or lust, since the
material at issue did have such a focus.
212
Although the Court in Winters struck down the statute, it did so on
vagueness grounds while seeming to tolerate the inclusion of such material
within the category of indecent and obscene.2 3 The Court noted that the
statute went beyond punishing the distribution of material that was obscene
or indecent "in the usual sense" and also reached magazines that were
"indecent and obscene because they 'massed' stories of bloodshed and
lust to incite crimes. '21 4 The Court also noted that the material at issue
was not "indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the
law '  and that the material was not "indecent and 'obscene, as formerly
understood. ' 21 6 Yet, the Court did not'strike the statute down because it
categorized non-erotic material as obscene. Rather, the Court warned
against the implication that the state could not punish the circulation of
objectionable materiial, within first amendment limitations, under a
sufficiently definite statute217 and that "[n]either the states nor Congress
are prevented by the requirement of specificity from carrying out their duty
of eliminating evils to which, in their judgment, such publications give
rise. ' 2 11
Although- believing that New York's statute employed an expanded
definition of "obscene, ' such an increased inclusion is not what caused
the statute to be declared unconstitutional. If the. Court believed that only
erotic material could be banned as obscene, the conviction and statute
easily would have fallen on that basis-. Instead, it was a chilling-effect
concern that led to the statute's demise:
[W]e find the specification of publications, prohibited from
distribution, too uncertain and indefinite to justify the
conviction of this petitioner. Even though all detective tales
and treatises on criminology are not forbidden, and though
publications made up of criminal deeds not characterized by
bloodshed ,or lust are omitted from the interpretation of the
Court of Appeals, we think fair use of collections of
21I Id. (quoting Winters, 63 N.E.2d at 99).
212 id.
213 Id. at 519-20.
214 Id. at 513.
215 Id. at 519.
216 id.
217 Id. at 520.
218 id.
219 But see infra notes 339-80 and accompanying text.
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pictures and stories would be interdicted because of the
utter impossibility of the actor or the trier to know where
this new standard of guilt would draw the line between the
allowable and the forbidden publications.2
It did not seem to the Court "that an honest distributor of publications
could know when he might be held to have ignored such a prohibition.
Collections of tales of war horrors, otherwise unexceptionable, might well
be found to be 'massed' so as to become 'vehicles for inciting violent and
depraved crimes.""'22
A second Supreme Court case of interest is Kingsley Books v. Brown,222
handed down the same day as Roth. Kingsley Books held that injunctions
may issue against the sale and distribution of obscene material.223 The
obscenity of the material against which the injunction was sought was not
contested and the sole question was the propriety of issuing an
injunction.2" The failure to object to the finding of obscenity is telling in
that the material at issue was primarily violent rather than sexual.
The publication giving rise to Kingsley Books was a series of "paper-
covered obscene booklets ' 225 published under the title Nights of Horror.
Although the New York state court also had labeled the material
"obscene," the description and objections ,presented by that court focused
strongly on the material's violent aspects.226 That is not to say that the
lower court did not consider the material to be without sexual content. The
court noted that, although sexual relationships can be beautiful and healthy,
the publications in question did not reflect such beauty. 227 Citing Judge
Learned Hand's view that "the word 'obscene' should 'be allowed to
indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and
shame,' ' '228 the court had no trouble finding that.
"Nights of Horror" will be found resting at the foot of the
scale, clearly marked "shame". No matter how strict the
test or how broad the criteria, these volumes will readily
measure up to and even surpass the most generous standard.
220 Winters, 333 U.S. at 519.
221 Id. at 520.
222 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
223 Id. at 444-45.
224 id.
225 Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
226 Burke v. Kingsley Books, 142 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 134
N.E.2d 461 (N.Y. 1956), aff U, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
227 Id. at 741.
228 Id. (quoting United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
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The booklets in evidence offer naught but glorified concepts
of lustful and vicious concupiscence, and by their tenor
deride love and virtue, invite crime and voluptuousness, and
excite lecherous desires .... There is no true dissemination
of lawful ideas-rather there is a direct incitement to sex
crimes and the sordid excitement of brutality.22 9
The court also stated that the material would affect the libido of the
normal, healthy person and that the effect on the abnormal person could
be disastrous on the individual and others.230
The court also went to some length to state its view that the materials
were not literature but pornography, lacking plot and style and failing to
meet any literary standards. 21 The covers included sexually suggestive
drawings, and the volume of misspelled words, poor grammar, and printing
errors showed no "genuine literary intent. '232 The only contribution to
literature was, in the court's view, as a glossary of terms of sexual
anatomy and practices.233
Although the court did label the material pornographic, the major focus
of its objection was on the publications' depictions of violence:
"Nights of Horror" is no haphazard title. Perverted sexual
acts and macabre tortures of the human body are repeatedly
depicted. The books contain numbers of acts of male
torturing female and some vice versa-by most ingenious
means. These gruesome acts included such horrors as
cauterizing a woman's breast with a hot iron, placing hot
coals against a woman's breasts, tearing breasts off, placing
hot irons against a female's armpits, pulling off a girl's
fingernails with white-hot pincers, completely singeing
away the body hairs, working a female's skin away from
her flesh with a knife, gouging and burning eyes out of
their sockets, ringing the nipples of the breast with needles.
Hanging by the thumbs, hair pulling, skin burning, putting
on bone-compressing iron boots, were usual. The torture
rack abounded. Self-torture was frequent. Sucking a
victim's blood was pictured; and so was pouring molten
lead into a girl's mouth and ears; and putting honey on a
229 Id.
230 Id. at 742.
231 Id.
232 id.
233 Id.
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girl's breasts, vagina and buttocks-and then putting
hundreds of great red ants on the honey.234
Certainly, portions of the violence depicted did involve sex-specific
anatomical structures. The general tenor of the material, however, appears
to be the description of the infliction of pain on every conceivable sensitive
area of the body. Genitals and breasts provided such sensitive areas, but so
did armpits, eyes, fingernails, thumbs, and skin and bones generally. 235
Although the court noted the expression of a belief in male power over
females and of older males over youth, and also the depiction of sodomy,
rape, lesbianism, and seduction,236 these subjects alone would not make the
material obscene. A work is not obscene because it discusses an
objectional subject or argues for an objectional thesis.237 Obscenity is
instead based on the material used to discuss that subject or argue for that
thesis.238 Such material must include objectional depictions of acts. 9
Although those acts have most commonly been sexual or excretory, the
objections to Nights of Horror appear primarily to be over its depiction of
violence. In fact, the complaint upon which the prosecution proceeded was
filed in September of 1954,240 just one month after
New Yorkers were stunned to learn of the wanton savagery
of four Brooklyn teen-agers who horsewhipped, beat, kicked,
and burned their several victims, allegedly drowning one of
them-all for amusement. The eighteen-year-old leader...
boasted of having read every volume in the Nights of Horror
series. A psychiatrist who examined him found "the
parallelism is complete" between Nights of Horror texts
and pictures and the methods used by the youthful killers.241
The impetus for prosecution appears to have been over violence rather than
eroticism.
234 Id.
235 id.
236 Id. at 742-43.
237 See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (portraying sexual
immorality as acceptable or proper behavior not in itself obscene); American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that pornography statutes may
not select among viewpoints), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
238 Kingsley lnt 7 Pictures, 360 U.S. at 688.
239 Id.
240 Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 438.
241 RICHARD H. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES? PORNOGRAPHY IN-AND OUT OF-COURT 44
(1967) (footnote omitted).
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Although both Winters and Kingsley Books were cases from New York,
legislative concern over violence was more widespread than these two cases
might indicate.242 Justice Frankfurter dissented in Winters and was joined
by Justices Jackson and Burton.243 In that dissent, he noted that twenty
states had the same legislation as that which was struck down as vague,244
and that four other states had statutes that were similar but not identical.245
142 See infra notes 293-334 and accompanying text.
243 Winters, 333 U.S. at 520 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
244 Justice Frankfurter stated:
These are the statutes that fall by this decision:
1. Gen. Stat. Conn. (1930) c. 329, § 6245, derived from L. 1885, c. 47, § 2.
2. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd) c. 38, § 106, derived from Act of June 3, 1889,
p. 114, § 1 (minors).
3. Iowa Code (1946) § 725.8, derived from 21 Acts, Gen. Assembly, c. 177, §
4 (1886) (minors).
4. Gen. Stats. Kan. (1935), § 21-1102, derived from L. 1886, c. 101, § 1.
5. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1946) § 436.110, derived from L. 1891-93, c. 182, § 217
(1893) (similar).
6. Rev. Stat. Maine (1944) c. 121, § 27, derived from Acts and Resolves 1885,
c. 348, § I (minors).
7. Ann. Code Md. (1939) Art. 27, § 496, derived from L. 1894, c. 271, § 2.
8. Ann. Laws Mass. (1933) c. 272, § 30, derived from Acts and Resolves 1885,
c. 305 (minors).
9. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) § 28.576, derived from L. 1885, No. 138.
10. Minn. Stat. (1945) § 617.72, derived from L. 1885, c. 268, § 1 (minors).
11. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939), § 4656, derived from Act of April 2, 1885, p. 146, §
1 (minors).
12. Rev. Code Mont. (1935), § 11134, derived from Act of March 4, 1891, p.
255, § 1 (minors).
13. Rev. Stat. Neb. (1943) § 28-924, derived from L.1887, c. 113, § 4 (minors).
14. N.Y. Consol. L. (1938) Penal Law, Art. 106, § 1141(2), derived from L.
1884, c. 380.
15. N. D. Rev. Code (1943) § 12-2109, derived from L. 1895, c. 84, § I
(similar).
16. Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1940) § 13035, derived from 82 Sess. L.
184 (1885) (similar).
17. Ore. Comp. L. Ann. (1940) § 23-924, derived from Act of Feb. 25, 1885, p.
126 (similar).
18. Pa. Stat. Ann. (1945) Tit. 18,. § 4524, derived from L. 1887, P.L. 38, § 2.
19. Rev. Stat. Wash. (Remington, 1932) § 2459(2), derived from L. 1909, c. 249,
§ 207(2).
20. Wis. Stat. (1945) § 351.38(4), derived from L. 1901, c. 256.
Winters, 333 U.S. at 522-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted); see also infra
notes 293-330 and accompanying text.
245 Justice Frankfurter stated:
The following statutes are somewhat similar, but may not necessarily be rendered
unconstitutional by the Court's decision in the instant case:
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III. A COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL HISTORIES OF SEX AND VIOLENCE AS
OBSCENITY
There seems to be general accord that the origins of censorship and
obscenity law were religious. Professor Schauer notes that in ancient drama
and writing there was full toleration for sexually explicit material, but that
blasphemy and heresy were strongly condemned.246 Professor Tribe agrees
that early censorship was aimed at religious ideas and notes religious
connotations to words such as "profane" as meaning in front of a temple,
"obscene" as in the way of a stage for religious rites, and "lewd" as
in lay or non-clerical.247
According to Schauer, it was not until the sixteenth century in England
that any law resembling modem obscenity law began to appear, but even
that law was still primarily aimed at heresy, now religious and political,
and sedition.248 Professor Alpert finds general agreement that the first
reported obscenity case was The King v. Sir Charles Sedley249 in 166J.25O
Schauer notes the same general agreement but notes that the case is clearly
distinguishable on its facts from any concern about literary obscenity.25
Sedley is indeed distinguishable.252 Although Sir Charles Sedley did,
while in a drunken state, appear naked on a balcony in London with
several others who also exposed themselves in indecent postures, it appears
not to have been his nakedness alone that led to his conviction. He also
gave a speech containing profanities and showered the audience below
with bottles of urine, causing a riot.2 3 His conviction was "for shewing
himself naked in a balcony, and throwing down bottles (pist in) vi & armis
among the people in Covent Garden, contra pacem and to the scandal of
1. Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935) c. 48, § 217, derived from Act of April 9, 1885, p.
172, § 1.
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (1934) § 2607, derived from L. 1895, c. 109.
3. S. D. Code (1939) § 13.1722(4), derived from L. 1913, c. 241, § 4.
4. Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936), Penal Code, Art. 527, derived from L. 1897, c. 116.
Id. at 523 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
246 FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 1-3 (1976).
247 TRIBE, supra note 198, at 19-20. Tribe does note an alternate derivation of
"obscene" as adverse or ill-omened, id. at 19, and that "pornography" is more focused
on sexual material as derived from writing about harlots, id. at 20; see also infra notes
341-80 and accompanying text, on the derivation of "obscene."
248 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 3.
249 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (K.B. 1663); 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B. 1663).
250 Leo M. Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 HARV. L. REV. 40,
40-41 (1938).
251 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 4.
252 See id.; Alpert, supra note 250, at 42.
253 Sedley, 83 Eng. Rep. at 1147.
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the Government. 25 4 The focus may be seen to be as much on causing
violence through his "vi & armis" acts, thereby breaching the peace.
Although he may have been naked, he seems to have been as intent on
insulting the crowd as on appealing to their sense of the erotic.
If this is the basis of obscenity law, then as Professor Alpert says, "[a]
flimsier, more appallingly pointless foundation for the superstructure of
law that was later erected could hardly have been deliberately laid."'2 55
Although the basis may or may not be flimsy, it is as good a basis for
pr6secuting displays of violence as it is for prosecuting displays of sexual
activity.
Professor Alpert calls Queen v. Read, 56 a 1708 case, the first actual
prosecution for literary obscenity.257 Although Read did address literature
rather than incitement to riot, the court rejected the idea of bringing
indictments for obscenity.258 In dismissing the indictment, the court said
"[a] crime that shakes religion, as profaneness on the stage, &c. is
indictable; but writing an obscene book, as that entitled, The Fifteen
Plagues of a Maidenhead, is not indictable, but punishable only in the
Spiritual Court. ' 259 The publication of the book simply was not against
any law. "[I]t indeed tends to the corruption of good manners, but that is
not sufficient ... to punish."
21
The next English case, in 1727, also might be argued to have failed to
establish obscenity law in its modem focus on sexual or excretory
activities. Dominus Rex v. Curl261 involved a conviction for publishing the
book Venus in the Cloister, or the Nun in Her Smock. Although the
content of the book was a dialogue on lesbian love, and therefore sexual,
its setting was in a convent, and therefore religious. Schauer suggests that,
although the conviction might be seen as having religious overtones, the
anti-religious elements were anti-Catholic rather than anti-Church of
England, and therefore seem insignificant.262 On the other hand, Alpert
interprets the case as sustaining the indictment because of its attack on
religion, and therefore able to be tried in the common law courts. 263 In
254 Id. at 1146-47.
255 Alpert, supra note 250, at 43.
256 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (Q.B. 1708), overruled by Dominus Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange 789
(K.B. 1727).
257 Alpert, supra note 250, at 43.
258 Read, 88 Eng. Rep. at 953.
259 Id.
260 92 Eng. Rep. 777 (1708) (second report of Read).
261 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B. 1727).
262 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 5.
263 Alpert, supra note 250, at 44.
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Alpert's view, even with Read, the courts were not concerned with
obscene literature but rather with punishing offenses against religion.2 64
In any case, English obscenity law appears to have been relatively
dormant throughout the 1700s. 265 Both Schauer and Alpert do note the
prosecution of John Wilkes in the 1760s for publishing his Essay on
Woman,266 but Schauer dismisses the case as one in which Wilkes'
offenses were political and his prosecution politically motivated.267 Alpert
is in accord noting that the incentive to prosecute really sprang from the
publication of a satirical work exposing corruption in the govemment,
insinuating that King George III was an imbecile, and suggesting the
involvement of the King's mother in an illicit relationship. 268 The Essay
on Woman was only "an instrument, a stratagem, and an excuse for
hostilities in the guise of a crusade.
' 269
The state of English obscenity law at the time of the American
Revolution was not focused on sexual or excretory activities. In the early
1800s, English obscenity law did begin to develop into what resembles
modem law, but Professor Schauer still notes a lack of definition for
obscenity until 1868.270 Professor Alpert, speaking of the state of English
law in 1763, says:
the first hundred years which followed Sedley's cavortings
on a Covent Garden balcony yielded scarcely anything
conclusive as to literary obscenity. There is no definition of
the term. There is no basis of identification. There is no
unity in describing what is obscene literature, or in pro-
secuting it. There is little more than the ability to smell it. 27'
Even when, in Schauer's view,272 an English definition did emerge in
1868 in Queen v. Hicklin,273 it is still not clear that such prosecutions were
264 Id.
265 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 6.
266 The King v. John Wilkes, 95 Eng. Rep. 737 (K.B. 1764).
267 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 6.
268 Alpert, supra note 250, at 44.
269 Id. at 45.
270 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 7.
271 Alpert, supra note 250, at 47. Alpert's summary might be read so as to conclude
that a focus on sex did not exist. Even after the focus on sexual and excretory activities
became clear in Roth and its progeny, Justice Stewart still could not define obscenity, but
knew it when he saw it rather than smelled it. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
272 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 7.
273 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
[Vol. 3:1
MEDIA VIOLENCE
to be limited to sexual explicitness. Hicklin concerned the publication of
a pamphlet titled The Confessional Unmasked, Shewing the Depravity of
the Roman Priesthood, the Iniquity of the Confessional, and the Questions
Put to Females in Confession. Although the anti-Catholic theme could be
seen as an extension of the censorship protection given religion,274 the Lord
Chief Justice presented a rather broad definition: "The test of obscenity
is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication of-this sort may fall." '275
Although the test certainly is broad enough to go beyond religious or
political heresy and to encompass sexually explicit materials, it also seems
broad enough to. include depictions of violence, if such publications can
"deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences."276
The law in the colonies prior to the American Revolution also censored
blasphemy and heresy, rather than obscenity in anything like its modern
sense. All of the statutes prior to the Bill of Rights had such a focus.2 77
Only one statute used the word "obscene," and it too only banned
obscenity in attacks on religion.278 After the adoption of the First
Amendment, the statutes and cases did begin to concentrate on material
with a sexual content, with the focus becoming clearer as the years
passed. 279 Even in these years, however, Professor Schauer suggests a
broad definition of obscenity.28° Under the definition developed in the few
pre-Civil War cases, obscene material was "whatever outrages decency
and is injurious to public morals. ' 28 1 Although that test may include
sexually obscene material, it certainly does not exclude violent material.
274 Here, too, the fact that the attack was on the Catholic church would weaken that
claim. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
275 Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371.
276 Id; see infra notes 439-43 and accompanying text (concerning the effects of
exposure to depictions of violence).
277 See supra notes 56-103 and accompanying text; see also SCHAUER, supra note 246,
at 8 ("All of the colonies made blasphemy or heresy a crime, by statute, but sexual
materials not having an antireligious aspect were left generally untouched." ) (footnote
omitted).
278 1712 Mass. Bay Acts and Laws, ch. CV, § 8, 1814 Mass. Bay Colony Charters &
Laws 39; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 109-95, 246-88 and accompanying text.
280 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 10-11.
281 State v. Rose, 32 Mo. 560, 561 (1862); State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315, 317 (1857)
(quoting WILLIAM RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 46 (1857)); see
also State v. Gardner, 28 Mo. 90 (1859) (upholding conviction for.public indecency).
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Professors Lockhart and McClure also note that there were few pre-
Civil War cases involving obscene literature.282 They interpret the lack of
cases as due not to any lack of pornography; rather, the scarcity of cases
meant that the issue of pornography was not seen as sufficiently important
to call for censorship by the state.283
Morris Ernst traces the current widespread bans on sexually obscene
materials to the early 1870s and to the work of Anthony Comstock, a
"neurotic individual" who enjoyed the financial support of J.P.
28284itMorgan.284 The Comstock Act,"' passed with less than ten minutes of
debate, "placed in a separate banned area all material which would excite
sexually impure thoughts. ' 286 Even after the Comstock Act, however, at
least one federal court seemed to include nonsexual material within the
category of the obscene. In 1889, a person was convicted in federal court
for mailing a postcard calling someone a radical, and the same court
convicted another defendant for mailing a postcard to a newspaper saying,
"You can take your paper and Democracy and go to hell with it."
287
Nonetheless, the focus on sex appeared to be developing, and Schauer
finds it finally clear with the decision in Swearingen v. United States2 88 in
1896 that only sexually oriented material could be obscene.289
Obscenity law, then, truly first appeared in the United States only after
the adoption of the First Amendment. Even then the focus of such law was
unclear. Although there are statutes and some cases dating from the pre-
Civil War era, the focus on sexual or excretory activities developed only
after the Civil War and the Civil War Amendments.
The statutory and case law justification for obscenity law then has its
weaknesses; however, the justification for the Supreme Court's later
insistence that only the erotic can be obscene is even weaker. The pre-Bill
of Rights law did not ban sexual obscenity, but rather what law there was
protected religion.290 Laws in that era also, of course, did not ban violent
"' William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and
the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 324 (1954).
283 Id. at 325.
28 MORRIS L. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM 17 (1946).
285 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-1469 (1988 &
Supp. 1992)). Earlier Federal obscenity statutes exist, as well; see supra notes 161-92 and
accompanying text.
286 ERNST, supra note 284, at 17-18.
287 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 18 (citing United States v. Davis, 38 F. 326 (W.D.
Tenn. 1889) (postcard to "radical"); United States v. Olney, 38 F. 326, 328 (W.D. Tenn.
1889) (postcard to newspaper)).
288 161 U.S. 446 (1896).
289 Id. at 451.
290 See supra notes 54-113 and accompanying text.
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material. Despite this, if the existence of limitations on speech regarding
religion serves as a basis for later bans on sexual obscenity, there is no
reason why the same laws cannot also serve as a basis for a ban on
depictions of violence.
Any such focus on sex found after the Bill of Rights is irrelevant to
federal law; however, there might be some relevance in the Civil War and
post-Civil War era law to the constitutionality of state obscenity law. The
existence of state law on the subject might be used to argue that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate any first
amendment protection for obscene materials. That argument would be of
interest, however, only if the federal government could not ban the
sexually obscene. Since Roth concludes that the sexually obscene enjoys
no first amendment protection there is nothing to incorporate against the
states.
It is clear that there is a long history of bans on some forms of speech.
The Court used that history to show that not all speech is constitutionally
protected.29' The Court's history of obscenity law in Roth was an attempt
to show that obscenity was within that class of unprotected speech. Yet,
an equally compelling history can be presented for depictions of violence
being unprotected speech.292
Since there is no early legal history specifically showing that sexually
obscene material was unprotected, there is no need to show that depictions
of violence were specifically unprotected in the era of the Bill of Rights.
In the post-Bill of Rights era, in which obscenity law began to develop but
was not limited to sexual material, such laws support a ban on violence as
well as they support a ban on sexual material. To show an equal history,
it suffices to show that laws against depictions of violence developed in
the same era in which the laws became clear in their bans on sexual
material. Since the ban on, and limitation to, sexual material became clear
in the post-Civil War era, that is also the relevant era in which to look for
laws against the depiction of violence.
The post-Civil War era does provide a series of statutes banning the
distribution of violent material. Interestingly, the New York statute in that
era, struck down as vague in Winters v. New York,293 was enacted due to
the efforts of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice and the
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children,294 the
29' See supra notes 56-200 and accompanying text.
292 An analysis of the meaning of "obscenity" and of what historically has been
considered obscene in drama, including depictions of violence, is presented infra notes
359-78 and accompanying text.
293 333 U.S. 507 (1948); see supra notes 205-21 and accompanying text.
294 Winters, 333 U.S. at 520-21 n.1 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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organization established by the anti-obscenity crusader Anthony Com-
stock.295
In his dissent in Winters, Justice Frankfurter cited nineteen other state
statutes nearly identical to that found to be unconstitutionally vague. 296 He
cited four others as being substantially similar.297 As Justice Frankfurter
noted, the Connecticut statute he cited, with a lineage dating to 1885, was
repealed by the time the Winters decision was issued.298 The statute,
however, had banned the distribution or possession with intent to distribute
"any book, magazine, pamphlet or paper, devoted to the publication, or
principally made up of, criminal news, police reports or pictures and
stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime . . . .*"299 The statute was
contained in a chapter titled Offenses Against Humanity and Morality and
followed sections on blasphemy and obscenity.3 °°
The Illinois30 and Iowa 30 2 statutes, derived from 1889 and 1886
enactments respectively, both used nearly identical language in describing
the banned material,30 3 but limited the bans to distribution and exhibition
to minors. The Iowa statute is of interest in that the title of the section
was, Giving or showing obscene literature to minors. °4 At least in Iowa
in that era, the word "obscene" would appear not to be limited to
depictions of sexual or excretory activities, but also would include
depictions of crime.
The Kansas statute derived from another 1886 statute. That statute
dropped "lust" from the description of banned descriptions of
criminality, banning depictions of "bloodshed or crime. ' 30 5 The Act
applied to adults, as well as to minors, and again seemed to consider the
material obscene, as the section title was Dealing in obscene literature.°6
The Kentucky statute, dating from 1894, again used language nearly
identical to that of New York and Connecticut in describing the banned
295 SCHAUER, supra note 246, at 12.
296 Winters, 333 U.S. at 522-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see supra note 244.
297 Id. at 523 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see supra note 245.
298 Id. at 512.
299 1930 CONN. GEN. STAT., ch. 329, § 6245 (derived from 1885 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch.
47, § 2, repealed by 1935 Conn. Pub. Acts 216).
31 See generally 1930 CONN. GEN. STAT. ch. 329.
3'0 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106 (Smith-Hurd 1908) (derived from Act of June 3,
1889, p. 114, § 1).
302 IOWA CODE § 725.8 (1946) (derived from 1886 Iowa Acts 177, § 4).
303 "Bloodshed" is omitted from the Iowa statute, which instead reads "immoral
deeds, lust or crime." Id.
" IOWA CODE § 725.8.
305 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-1102 (1935) (derived from 1886 Kan. Sess. Laws 101, § 1).
306 71j
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material.3 °7 It criminalized distribution, exhibition, or possession with such
intent.30 8 Although the statute added a provision that use of a minor in such
distribution or exhibition was also an offense,30 9 the statute does not appear
to have been limited to distribution or exhibition to minors. The Kentucky
statute is illustrative of the fact that, although the statutes cited in the
Winters dissent had language nearly identical to the New York statute, the
earlier statutes from which they derived had the same effect but used
different language. The early Kentucky statute made it illegal to publish
or distribute "any paper, book, or periodical, the chief feature or
characteristics of which is to record the commission of crimes, to display,
by cuts or illustrations, crimes committed, the actors, pictures of criminals,
desperados, [or] fugitives from justice ....
The Maine. 31' Maryland 31 2 and Massachusetts313 statutes, derived from
1885, 1894, and 1885 statutes respectively, all addressed distribution or
exhibition to minors. While the Maine section title is Circulation among
minors of criminal news and obscene pictures,314 the title probably
indicates more of a grouping of two sorts of violations rather than an
inclusion of depictions of criminality within the obscene.
Although the Michigan statute, 31 5 derived from-an 1885 statute, applied
to distribution to adults as well as to minors, the Minnesota316 and
Missouri 31 7 statutes, also derived from 1885 statutes, addressed only
distribution to minors. Although the Montana 3 8 and Nebraska 319 statutes,
derived from 1891 and 1887 statutes respectively, are also limited to
minors, their titles are again of interest. The Montana statute was titled
307 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.110 (Baldwin 1946) (derived from 1891-1893 Ky. Acts
182, § 217).
308 id.
309 id.
310 1891-1893 Ky. Acts 182, § 217. The section also banned depictions of "men and
women in improper dress, lewd and unbecoming positions, or men and women influenced
by liquors, drugs, or stimulants." Id.
311 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 121, § 27 (West 1944) (derived from 1885 Me. Laws 348,
§ 1).
312 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 496 (1939) (derived from 1894 Md. Laws 271, § 2).
313 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 30 (West 1933) (derived from 1885 Mass. Acts
305).
314 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 121, § 27.
315 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.576 (Callaghan 1938) (derived from 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts
138).
316 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.72 (West 1945) (derived from 1885 Minn. Laws 268, § 1).
311 MO. REV. STAT. § 4656 (1939) (derived from 1885 Mo. Laws 146, § .1).
38 MONT. CODE ANN. § 11134 (1935) (derived from 1891 Mont. Laws 255, § 1).
319 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-924 (1943) (derived from 1887 Neb. Laws 113, § 4).
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Obscene literature not to be given to or sold by minors,"O and the
Nebraska statute was titled Obscene or criminal books; possession with
intent to exhibit or sell, sale to minors.32' The Nebraska title distinguishes
the two classes of material, though punishing both.322 The Montana statute,
however, appears to include depictions of criminality within the obscene.
The North Dakota statute, tracing its origins to an 1895 statute, is
contained in a section titled Buying, Selling, and Designing Obscene
Literature.323 The section applies to adults, as well as to minors, and
includes a ban on material "devoted principally or wholly to the pub-
lication of criminal news or pictures or stories of deeds of bloodshed or
crime .... 324 The Ohio statute, with an 1885 genesis, applies only to
minors, but also includes "obscene" within its title-Disposing of,
exhibiting, advertising, etc., obscene literature or drugs for criminal pur-
poses.325
Although Oregon's statute, with an 1885 derivation, includes
"obscene" within the section title, it does so as one of two classes, the
other being "exploitation of crime. ' 326 The statute has no age limitation
and bans any "publication that purports to relate or narrate the criminal
exploits of any desperate or convicted felon, or any book, paper, or other
publication that is principally devoted to, or contains, or is made up in part
of, accounts or stories of crime or lust or deeds of bloodshed ... 327
Among the last three statutes cited as identical, the Pennsylvania law,328
dating from 1887, applied only to minors. The Washington statute, derived
from a 1909 statute, applied to adults, and the section was titled simply
Obscene literature.329 Lastly, the Wisconsin statute, based on an 1899 law,
used language like that in New York in a statute applying to any
distribution of such materials.33°
The four statutes cited by Justice Frankfurter as substantially similar
also provide support for the proposition that many of the states had chosen
to ban depictions of violence. The Colorado statute, which originated in
320 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 11134.
321 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-924.
322 id.
323 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-2109 (1943) (derived from 1895 N.D. Laws 84, § 1).
324 Id.
325 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13035 (Baldwin 1940) (derived from 1885 Ohio Laws
184).
326 OR. REV. STAT. § 23-924 (1940) (derived from 1885 Or. Laws 126).
327 Id.
328 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4524 (1945) (derived from 1887 Pa. Laws 84, § 2).
329 WASH. REV. CODE § 2459(2) (1932) (derived from 1909 Wash. Laws 249,
§ 207(2)).
330 WIS. STAT. § 351.38(4) (1945) (derived from 1901 Wis. Laws 256).
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1885, included a ban on publishing "by pictures or descriptions, indecent
or immoral details of crime. ' 33' Here too, "obscene" was included in the
title of the section. The Indiana statute also is supportive. It derives from
an 1895- statute and bars the publishing or distribution of "any paper,
book or periodical the chief feature or characteristic of which is the record
of commission of crime or the display by cut or illustration of crimes
committed or of the acts or pictures of criminals [or] desperados ....
The 1913-based South Dakota statute makes it unlawful to "[p]resent[]
by or with moving pictures or in any manner any stories or scenes
illustrating illicit love, infidelity in family relations, murder, or striking an
officer of the law, which are suggestive of crime and immorality ....
Most questionable in its support is the Texas statute. That statute, derived
from an 1897 statute, bars material "devoted mainly to the publications
of scandals, whoring, lechery, assignations, intrigues between men and
women and immoral conduct of persons . . . .",33 Although criminality
may be immoral, it is not clear that the aim of the statute is a ban on
depictions of crime.
The statutes cited by Justice Frankfurter provide an insight into the
legal climate in the post-Civil War era, up to the 1948 Winters decision.
Prior to the late 1800s, there were bans on obscene materials, but it was
unclear what material was included within the category of the obscene.335
It is only with the 1896 decision in Swearingen v. United States3 6 that
Professor Schauer finds that obscenity clearly was limited to sexually
oriented material.337 In that same era, a significant number of states passed
statutes banning depictions of criminal acts.338 Some of those statutes,
those using "obscene" in their titles, may be viewed as an insistence that
the category of the obscene is not so limited. Other states, by enacting
statutes addressed to material no longer covered by obscenity statutes, may
be seen as wishing to ban such material without being concerned about the
label to be applied.
331 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217 (West 1935) (derived from 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws
172, § 1).
332 IND. CODE ANN. § 10-2805 (Bums 1934) (derived from 1895 Ind. Acts 109). The
section goes on to apply to illustrations of "men or women in lewd and unbecoming
positions or improper dress." Id.
333 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13.1722(4) (1939) (derived from 1913 S.D. Laws 241,
§ 4).
134 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 527 (West 1936) (derived from 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws
116).
335 See supra notes 246-88 and accompanying text.
336 161 U.S. 446 (1896).
337 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
... See infra notes 343-84 and accompanying text.
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IV. NON-LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF "OBSCENE"
The examination of statutory and case law showed that the concept of
obscenity had not been defined with any clarity prior to the late 1800s.339
The law did, however, use the word "obscene" without providing a
definition, in earlier cases and statutes.34° Some light might be shed on the
meaning of the term in those cases and statutes by an examination of the
derivation of the word and its use in ordinary language.1
4
There is some disagreement over the derivation of the word
"obscene." One derivation suggested by commentators is from ob
caenum which would be "on account of filth" or simply "filth." '342 An
alternative is from ab scaena or "off the stage," which might mean
either "not to be openly shown on the stage of life" '343 or alternatively,
"off the theatrical stage. ' 344
If the derivation is taken as relating to filth, it is unclear to what the
word ought to apply. Although some ordinary uses of the word "filth"
would justify including depictions of excretory activities within the concept
of obscenity, why should depictions of sexual activities be so included?
Since the results of excretory activities may qualify as filth, the ban on
depictions of such acts might be "on account of filth." Sexual acts are,
however, not themselves filth or filthy, so why would depictions of sexual
acts be banned "on account of filth"? Furthermore, if the products of
one's entrails are filth and depictions of the production may be banned,
ought not the entrails themselves be considered filth and depictions of their
exposure through a violent attack on the abdomen banned?
Certainly not all sexual acts are filthy, and a ban on all depictions of
sexual acts cannot be justified "on account of filth." Professor Nahmod
311 See supra notes 246-88 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 107-37 and accompanying text.
341 Dictionaries of an earlier era may not be of much use. Samuel Johnson defined
"obscene" as "Immodest; not agreeable to chastity of mind; causing lewd ideas[;]
Offensive; disgusting[;] Inauspicious; ill omened." SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773). Although "immodest" and "lewd" may point
toward sexual material, "offensive" and "disgusting," let alone "inauspicious" and
"ill omened," may not be so limited.
342 See, e.g., HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A
LIBERAL SOCIETY 210 (1969); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,
Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7 (1985).
343 CLOR, supra note 342, at 210 (citing HAVELOCK ELLIS, ON LIFE AND SEX 100
(1922)).
'44 See, e.g., WALTER ALLEN, To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT 147 (1962) ("Obscenity
seems originally to have meant that which could not be represented upon the stage. It is
related to ancient Greek theories of drama . ) (quoted in KUH, supra note 241, at
336-37 n.1).
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has, in fact, suggested an interesting justification for obscenity laws, based
not on the filth of sex but on its sacredness. In his view,
the obscenity exception to the First Amendment may ... be
explained in large measure as carving out an area in which
the state is permitted to maintain the sacred aspect of
sexuality so as to prevent private market forces from
debasing, commercializing and effectively desacralizing it.
Thus, certain kinds of obscenity are excluded from First
Amendment coverage not because they have little or no
value but rather because they have such high value that
they are sacred.345
Although it may be debatable whether the suggested rationale justifies a
first amendment exception, Professor Nahmod's approach is certainly
based on a healthier attitude toward sex than are those approaches that
would create the exception because of the filth which'.is depicted. .
Of course, not all depictions of sexual activity are banned as obscene.
Only those appealing to the prurient or shameful interests may be
banned.346 It may be tenable to argue that some sexual activities or aspects
of those activities are filthy, and an interest in those acts or aspects are
shameful. If obscenity is to be based on filth, then some way of defining
which acts or aspects are filthy must be presented.
Professor Clor presents a definition of obscenity that responds to some
of these concerns. Clor suggests a definition that appears to encompass
both the "on account of filth" and the "off the stage of life"
approaches. In his discussion, he offers two preliminary definitions of
obscenity. "[O]bscenity consists in making public that which is private;
it consists in an intrusion upon intimate physical processes and acts or
physical-emotional states; and [secondly] it consists in a degradation of the
human dimensions of life to a sub-human or merely physical level. ' 347
The two definitions are related in that "when the intimacies of life are
exposed to public view their human value may be depreciated. 34
8
341 Sheldon H. Nahmod, Adam, Eve and the First Amendment: Some Thoughts on the
Obscene as Sacred, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 377, 378 (1992). Interestingly, Professor
Nahmod's justification is perhaps unique in not being applicable to depictions of violence,
which few would argue are sacred experiences that would be cheapened by media
depictions.
346 Id. at 380 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487, 489 (1957)).
141 CLOR, supra note 342, at 225.
348 id.
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The relationship of the second definition to filth can be found in Clor's
analysis of a passage from Joseph Heller's Catch 22. In the passage,
Yossarian discovers a wounded friend, disemboweled but still barely alive.
Seeing the friend's entrails, as life and spirit slip away, Yossarian
concludes that "man is garbage. ' 349 The conclusion seems to be not that
the human body contains garbage, physical material that will eventually
decompose, but rather that the body viewed as purely physical, as divorced
from human spirit, is garbage. This is, for Clor, the nub of obscenity.
"Obscene literature may be defined as that literature which presents,
graphically and in detail, a degrading picture of human life and invites the
reader or viewer, not to contemplate that picture, but to wallow in it."'35
Clor's analysis is insightful. It is the depiction of the human spirit that
distinguishes a romantic film, even a romantic film depicting explicit sex,
from the depictions of explicit sex that might make another film obscene.
In the sexually obscene film, man and, more commonly, woman are
reduced to the subhuman, merely physical level-reduced to garbage or
filth. It is not the sexual act, but rather the focus solely on the physical
aspects of that act, that is filth.
Professor Clor also suggests that it is the purely physical side of human
existence that humans choose to remove from the stage of life. "The
element of obscenity ...consists in one's being 'too close' to other
persons performing intimate physical acts. ' 35' We withhold from the view
of others, and wish others to withhold from our view, those acts that are
governed by animal urges rather than the human spirit or in which the
observer can experience only the subhuman aspects of the act:
352
There are certain bodily acts which will tend to arouse
disgust in an observer who is not involved in the act and is
not, at the time subject to its urgencies. What the observer
sees is a human being governed by physiological urges and
functions. Now, to the participants, the act . . . can have
important personal and supra-biological meanings. But the
outside observer cannot share the experience of these
meanings; what he sees is simply the biological process.353
This view explains the private nature of sex, as well as the privacy
commonly accorded excretory activities. In the non-romantic physical
349 Id. at 231 (quoting JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22 at 449-50 (1962)).
350 Id. at 234.
311 Id. at 225.
352 Id. at 225-26.
... Id. at 226.
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urges of lust and in the need to eliminate, the human being is governed by
the same subhuman urges that affect animals. The reduction to subhuman,
to garbage, or to filth causes us to bar such activities from the open stage
of life.
What has been said of sex and excretion also can be applied to other
physical needs, drives, or inevitability. "[T]here can be ... obscene views
of death, of birth, of illness, and of acts such as eating . . . .Obscenity
makes a public exhibition of these phenomena and does so in a way that
their larger human context is lost or depreciated. 35 4 Obscenity is not
limited to sexual or excretory activities. "[O]bscene literature is that
literature which invites and stimulates the reader to adopt the obscene
posture toward human existence-to engage in the reduction of man's
values, functions, and ends to the animal or subhuman level. ' 355
Just as there is a difference between a sexually explicit romance and
sexual obscenity, there is a difference between a death scene and violent
obscenity. Sexual obscenity focuses on the physical aspects of sexuality,
while neglecting the aspects reflecting the human spirit. Romance focuses
on one of the highest aspects of that spirit. A death scene can certainly
focus on the human spirit, personal relationships, the meaning and intran-
sigence of life, or any of a myriad of other facets of the human spirit or
experience. On the other hand, such a scene can depict solely the physical
side of death. To the degree that the depiction is purely physical, to the
degree that the depiction presents the end of a person's life as though it
were the end of subhuman life, to the degree that the person is shown as
purely physical garbage, to that degree the depiction is obscene.356
Clearly, Clor's analysis shows why, under the "on account of filth"
or the "removed from the stage of life" derivation of "obscene,"
violence may be obscenity. To treat the human body as fodder for a chain
saw is to exclude the humanity of the victim of that violence. It is to treat
the person as subhuman, garbage, or filth. As such, it also is removed from
the stage of life. Although a person may wish to die peacefully in the
company of loved ones, that desire is based on elements of the human
spirit. Although presumably preferring to avoid the experience altogether,
if a person is to be dismembered or disemboweled, the experience is less
likely one the victim would want to share. The first death has its focus in
the human spirit; the second is subhuman.
114 Id. at 225.
311 Id. at 230.
356 That is not to say that subhuman, animal life is garbage. Films can quite movingly
depict the death of an animal, but do so most effectively when they focus on the spirit of
the animal. To the degree that the animal has spirit, that is in the higher animals, scenes
of animal mutilation, like slasher films, might be viewed as obscene.
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Recognizing that his approach extends to violence, Clor includes
violence within his definition of obscenity. An obscene depiction is "one
which tends predominantly to . . . [v]isually portray in detail, or
graphically describe in lurid detail, the violent physical destruction, torture,
or dismemberment of a human being, provided this is done to exploit
morbid or shameful interest in these matters and not for genuine scientific,
educational, or artistic purposes. ' ' 35 7 He also would include in his
definition a similarly lurid depiction of death or of a dead body.358
The other derivation suggested for "obscene" was "off the stage,"
in the sense of the theatrical stage. This approach has the advantage of
making claims that obscene material does not enjoy the protections of
freedoms of speech or press almost tautological. If obscene material is that
material that has been banned from the stage, then obviously such material
has not been protected. If that is the derivation, a look at the materials
historically banned from the stage is required.
The examination begins with the origins of Western drama in the
Greek theater. The Greeks are said to have been quite tolerant of sexual
and scatological themes in comedies but intolerant of violence, however
the comparison may be flawed. Although it may be, as "D.H. Lawrence
declared[,] that 'some of Aristophanes shocks everybody today, and didn't
galvanize the later Greeks at all,"' 359 the material spoken of is described
as "bawdy blasphemy. ' 360 A toleration for bawdy speech, even when
blasphemous, does not necessarily imply a toleration for the explicit acts
of modem sexual obscenity.
The Greeks were similarly tolerant of descriptions of violence.
Narrative poetry and drama contain such oral depictions.6 What Greek
drama appeared not to accept was the visual depiction of violent death.362
According to Professor Flickinger, "[t]he Greek theater suffered no scene
of bloodshed to be enacted before its audience. When the plot of the play
• . . required such an incident, the harrowing details were narrated by a
357 CLOR, supra note 342, at 245.
358 Id.
359 TRIBE, supra note 198, at 32 (quoting D.H. LAWRENCE, PORNOGRAPHY AND
OBSCENITY 5-6 (1929)).
360 Id.
.361 See, e.g., H.C. BALDRY, THE GREEK TRAGIC THEATRE 50 (1971) ("The ancient
Greeks were not squeamish about violence or death: from the Iliad onwards bloodshed
was a commonplace in narrative poetry......); see also infra notes 363-65 and
accompanying text.
362 See, e.g., Charles Segal, Violence and Dramatic Structure in Euripides 'Hecuba,
in VIOLENCE IN DRAMA 35, 35 (James Redmond ed., 1991) ("Greek drama, on the
whole, avoids the direct visual depiction of violence on the stage." ).
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messenger who had witnessed the event. ' 363 Professor Arnott is in accord:
"We are led up to the point where some violent deed is going to take
place, given the motives for the deed and the story behind it, but the deed
itself takes place off stage." '364
It has been suggested that the unwillingness to portray violence may
have been based on the small number of actors involved in Greek dramas.
Since there was no curtain, it is true that the actor who died on stage
would have to arise at the end of the scene to appear later in another
role.365 Professor Arnott, however, finds the convention to be based in
aesthetics or taste.366 Flickinger agrees:
It is customary to explain the Greek avoidance of violence
on aesthetic grounds; to assert that the susceptibilities of the
Greeks were so refined as to have been offended by scenes
of bloodshed. That which would be disagreeable or painful
to see in real life should never be presented to an
audience.367
There are also those who would question the conclusion that scenes of
violent death were confined to the offstage-were obscene. Professor
Walton notes that not all violence occurred offstage and that "Greek
tragedy does contain scenes of physical assault, suffering, and even death,
to be presented in full view of the audience. ' 368 Walton cites in support
of his conclusion Prometheus' death in an earthquake, and the suicides of
Ajax and Evadne.369 However, even those accepting the rule against
violence note an exception for suicide, death as the result of natural events,
or at the hands of the gods.370 It is homicide that could not be shown. It
was the violence of person against person that was obscene.
163 ROY C. FLICKINGER, THE GREEK THEATER AND ITS DRAMA 127-28 (4th ed. 1936).
364 PETER D. ARNOTT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GREEK THEATRE 22 (1959).
365 See PETER D. ARNOTT, GREEK SCENIC CONVENTIONS IN THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.
130 (1962); FLICKINGER, supra note 363, at 129.
366 ARNOTr, supra note 364, at 22 ("It is usually held that Greek taste forbade the
representation of death in view of the audience." ).
367 FLICKINGER, supra note 363, at 130.
368 J. MICHAEL WALTON, GREEK THEATRE PRACTICE 135 (1980).
369 Id. at 135-36.
3" FLICKINGER, supra note 363, at 129 ("The rule of Greek dramaturgy which has
just been described is liable to one notable exception-the dramatic characters may not
commit murder before the eyes of the spectators but they may commit suicide there." );
id. at 132 ("[T]he taboo.., prevented one actor from murdering another upon the stage.
But this taboo did not protect an actor against himself or against the assaults of nature or
of the gods. Hence suicides and natural deaths were permissible within the audience's
sight, though homicides were not." ).
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If "obscene" means banned from the stage, then the classical view
of obscenity included violence. Again, despite claims that the Greeks were
tolerant of sexual themes, it may be a mistake to conclude that materials
obscene under modem law would have been accepted. Even if such
sexually explicit matter would have been considered obscene, however, so
also was violence.
The later theater appears not to have been so averse to violence. In
medieval drama violence seems common:
In the name of sacred instruction and secular diversion, the
Apostles were graphically stoned, stabbed, blinded,
crucified, and flayed. Other holy men and women variously
and vigorously had their teeth wrenched out, their breasts
tom off, and their bodies scourged, shot with arrows, baked,
grilled, and burned. Audiences were also treated to bestial
scenes of infanticide, and to broad comedies about divinely
mutilated Jews. No torment was too extreme or too gory for
representation, as medieval drama ignored the classical
tenet, advanced by Horace, of not bringing upon the stage
what should be performed behind the scenes.37'
The religious lessons of the violent mysteres might justify, without really
changing the rule, an exception from the classical view of the obscene.
Just as death at the hands of the gods was not obscene, death for the cause
of God also might be non-obscene. Public execution, however, also
became popular entertainment. Although such executions may serve an
educational, deterrent purpose, that the people of Mons purchased a
criminal from a nearby town so that they could see him executed372 may
indicate more of an interest in entertainment. It may simply be that the
"[m]iracle plays and mysteres were violent theatre for a violent era ' 373
and that the view of obscenity had changed.
It is also the case that the classics of English drama contained violence.
Shakespeare's plays certainly contain scenes of violence.374 Although
"[c]ompared to his predecessors . . . Shakespeare seems not much
addicted to violence ... rarely go[ing] in for bizarre forms of it, as do a
371 John Gatton, 'There Must Be Blood '" Mutilation and Martyrdom on the Medieval
Stage, in VIOLENCE IN DRAMA, supra note 362, at 79.
372 Id. at 80.
373 Id.
374 See generally Jonas Barish, Shakespearean Violence: A Preliminary Survey, in
VIOLENCE IN DRAMA, supra note 362, at 101, 102.
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number of earlier and later playwrights," '375 murder is not uncommon.
Although the goriness of the medieval era is missing, it may still be
somewhat less violent theater for a somewhat less violent era.
In later continental theater, Flickinger argues that the Greek aesthetic
objection to violence carried over to French drama in the early part of the
twentieth century:
This is the French position. . . . "A character in [French]
tragedy could be permitted to kill himself, whether he did
it by poison or steel: what he was not suffered to do was to
kill someone else. And while nothing was to be shown on
the stage which could offend the feelings through the
medium of the eyes, equally was nothing to be narrated
with the accompaniment of any adjuncts that could possibly
arouse disagreeable sensations in the mind.' 3 76
On the other hand, starting in the same era, from 1897 to 1962, and in the
same country, the Grand-Guignol Theater in Paris "was devoted to horror
plays designed to terrorize and amuse its audiences." '377 "[T]he
Guignolers [went] happily . . . about their business of gouging out one
another's eyes, cooking villains in vats of sulphuric acid, hurling vitriol
and cutting throats, all to the accompaniment of hysterical laughter and
hideous shrieks. ' 378
Although the classical view may have been that violence is obscene,
views of violence as obscenity seem to have varied with the times; of
course, the same is true of sexual activities as obscenity. Professor Kuh
cites the psychologists Eberhard and Phyllis Kronhausen as having
determined that "exhibitions of human intercourse for the entertainment
of special guests were not at all rare occurrences ... through part of the
18th century in France, and it is well to remember that these exhibitions
took place before mixed audiences of men and women.''3 79
As either an aesthetic or moral concept, the focus of obscenity has
changed over time. What was acceptable on the stage in one era may be
unacceptable in another. What is clear is that "obscene" as banned from
375 id.
376 FLICKINGER, supra note 363, at 130 (quoting THOMAS R. LOUNSBURY,
SHAKESPEARE AS A DRAMATIC ARTIST 175 (1902)).
317 John Callahan, The Ultimate in Theatre Violence, in VIOLENCE IN DRAMA, supra
note 362, at 165.
371 Id. (quoting Speaking of Pictures, LIFE, Apr. 28, 1947, at 15).
17' KUH, supra note 241, at 4 (quoting EBERHARD KRONHAUSEN & PHYLLIS
KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 66-67 (1964)).
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the stage does not have a sole application to sexual or excretory activities.
Such activities may only be talked about in some eras, with more or less
explicitness, but they could be graphically displayed in other eras. The
same is true of violence; it could only be described in Greek drama but
could be shown in gory detail in other eras. Obscenity is broader than sex
and excretion. As Professor Schauer says, "'[o]bscene' refers to that
which is repugnant or disgusting to the senses, or offensive, filthy, foul,
repulsive, or loathsome. . . . It is not incorrect to say that war or gory
violence is obscene .... ""0
V. POLICY BASES FOR BANNING THE OBSCENE
In addition to the historical bases for banning the obscene, the Roth
Court and various commentators have presented policy reasons for denying
first amendment protection to obscene materials. The policy analysis has
been limited to the consideration of depictions of sexual activity, but the
policy reasons carry over with equal weight to violence as obscenity.
The policy reasons for denying first amendment protection to obscene
material, as presented by the Roth opinion, had an historical flavor. Policy
concerns expressed by the Framers have extremely strong standing as
explanations for the scope of the protections enacted in response to those
concerns. In its search for policy, the Court says that the first amendment
speech and press protections were "fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people." 38' As evidence for that proposition, the opinion
quotes a 1774 letter from the Continental Congress to the people of
Quebec:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of
the press. The importance of this consists, besides the
advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general,
in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration
of Government, its ready communication of thoughts
between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union
among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or
intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of
conducting affairs.382
380 FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 179 (1982).
38 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
381 Id. (quoting 1 J. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)).
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This rationale appears similar to what Professor Blasi calls the
"checking value" of the First Amendment, the role that "free speech,
a free press, and free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power
by public officials. ' 383 It also reflects Professor Meiklejohn's similar,
though distinct, theory that for speech to enjoy first amendment protection,
it should be related to self-governance. 38' The difference between the two
theories seems to hinge on Meiklejohn's regular active role of the citizen
and Blasi's more exceptional role of the citizen.385
Blasi does appear to recognize other values behind the first amendment
protections of speech and press. He identifies four core values behind the
First Amendment: furtherance of self-government, individual autonomy,
providing for a check on government, and creating a marketplace of
ideas. 386 At least one, and perhaps two, of these values would not be
encompassed within the checking value. Nonetheless, he says: "[I]f one
had to identify the single value that was uppermost in the minds of the
persons who drafted and ratified the First Amendment, this checking value
would be the most likely candidate. 387
Although the "checking value" theory does identify an important area
that must lie at the core of any first amendment protections, the argument
that the protection of the Amendment must be limited to that area is more
difficult to make. Blasi does offer such an argument. He suggests that
courts should adopt a "pathological perspective" toward the First
Amendment.388 It should be interpreted to provide maximum protection in
periods of intolerance and should be targeted for the worst of times.'
Although he recognizes that there may be an argument for expansive
readings in normal times, so that it might prove difficult to cut back on an
amendment of wide application, he rejects that conclusion. 390 He instead
eventually adopts a position that "[b]etter equipped for the storms of
383 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527. Blasi cites the same letter to the inhabitants of Quebec cited by
the Roth opinion.
384 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,. FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948).
311 See Blasi, supra note 383, at 542 (basing the checking approach on democratic
theory, but differing from Meiklejohn's approach in that "the role of the ordinary citizen
is not so much to contribute on a continuing basis to the formation of public policy as to
retain a veto power to be employed when the decisions of officials pass certain bounds").
386 Id. at 524, 527.
387 Id. at 527.
388 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449 (1985).
389 Id. at 449-50.
390 Id. at 477.
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pathology might be a lean, trim First Amendment that covered only
activities most people would recognize as serious, time-honored forms of
communication.''
391
The "checking value" or self-governance view of the scope of first
amendment protection would deny such protection to sexual obscenity, as
the Court holds in Roth.392 Although pornography may be used as a
medium for political expression, obscenity in the Roth definition was
limited to material totally lacking in social, including political, importance.
Even under the Miller definition, pornography is only obscene if it "lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. ' 393 If material is
obscene, it is not seriously political pornography and would not enjoy
protection.
The important point here is that, just as sexual obscenity lacks
protection under the "checking value" or self-governance theories, so
also does violent obscenity, if properly defined. If the Miller definition is
adapted to allow a ban on explicit depictions of violence only when such
depictions lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,
' 394
any work considered violent obscenity by definition would not have
serious political value. Just as sexually obscene works without serious
political value are unprotected under the "checking value" limitation,
violently obscene works lack serious political value and are similarly
unprotected.
If the values found so central by Blasi and Meiklejohn provided the
limits of first amendment protections, that would be the end of the
argument. Instead, although the values that they and the Roth opinion
identify are certainly important, and may be viewed as core values, the
Amendment does protect other expression. Even expression that would
otherwise be considered sexually obscene is unprotected only if "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." '395 In addition to the political value that might speak to
the checking value or self-government, literature, art, and science enjoy
protection, even in the context of sexual explicitness.
The Court in Roth itself recognized that first amendment protections
extend beyond purely political speech. "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon
391 Id.
392 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
393 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
31 See infra notes 458-64 and accompanying text.
391 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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the limited area of more important interests." '396 Nonetheless, the Court
determined that obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance" '397 and as such is undeserving of the protections of the First
Amendment.
The Court also quoted its opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
398
which had denied constitutional protection for fighting words. The Roth
Court quoted dicta from Chaplinsky to the effect that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene .... It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality .. .
It may be difficult to determine the social value or importance of
varying forms of speech or message. Although the distinction between
political speech and non-political speech may be difficult only at the
border, with some speech clearly political and some clearly non-political,
it would appear to be more difficult to distinguish differing types of
entertainment. Nonetheless, to the degree that the entertainment departs
from core protected speech, the less protection it appears to merit.
Professor Schauer argues that sexual obscenity departs completely from
the sphere of protected speech, that it is in fact nonspeech. 400 He discusses
what he admits is "a hypothetical extreme example of what is commonly
referred to as 'hard core pornography."' 40 The hypothetical ten-minute
film is nothing but a close up of sexual organs engaged in intercourse,
with "no variety, no dialogue, no music, no attempt at artistic depiction,
and not even any view of the faces of the participants. '40 2 The audience
is assumed to be engaged in masturbation.
Schauer argues that:
396 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (footnote omitted).
397 Id.
398 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
399 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
' SCHAUER, supra note 380, at 178-88.
401 Id. at 181.
402 Id.
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[A]ny definition of "speech" (or any definition of the
coverage of the concept of freedom of speech) that included
this film in this setting is being bizarrely literal or
formalistic. Here the vendor is selling a product for the
purpose of inducing immediate sexual stimulation. There
are virtually no differences in intent and effect from the
sale of a plastic or vibrating sex aid, the sale of a body
through prostitution, or the sex act itself. At its most
extreme, hard core pornography is a sex aid, no more and
no less, and the fact that there is no physical contact is only
fortuitous.4 3
If pornography is simply a sex aid, it deserves, in Schauer's view, no
protection. 40 4 It is to be treated the same as any physical device designed
to stimulate. "The mere fact that in pornography the stimulating
experience is initiated by visual rather than tactile means is irrelevant if
every other aspect of the experience is the same. Neither involves
communication in the way that language or pictures do."40 5
Schauer recognizes that serious literature also can evoke physical or
quasi-physical arousal, as may art or music. 40 6 He also acknowledges that
there are mental elements to physical sensations, including sexual arousal,
but the simple existence of a mental element does not make for a
communicative act.40 7 Nonetheless, he says that this "misconceives the
issue. '
It is not the presence of a physical effect that triggers the
exclusion from coverage of that which would otherwise be
covered by the principle of free speech. Rather, it is that
some pornographic items contain none of the elements that
would cause them to be covered in the first instance. The
basis of the exclusion of hard core pornography from the
coverage of the Free Speech Principle is not that it has a
physical effect, but that it has nothing else.409
403 Id.
404 id.
405 Id. at 182.
406 id.
407 Id.
408 id.
409 Id.
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Professor Schauer is certainly correct in noting that there is a mental
element to pornography-caused sexual arousal. Although the final physical
effect may be hormonal, the visual images must be processed by the brain
before that effect can result. Although a physical stimulator does not
require any higher level mental information processing for its effects, the
mental element to pornography-based arousal is not sufficiently
distinguishing.
The objection to including sexually obscene materials within the
protections of freedom of speech appears to be that the brain is not its
final audience or even a co-equal audience. Although music, art, and
romantic literature may stimulate, they also communicate other messages
aimed at the intellect. The brain is at least a co-equal audience. The
position that the brain is a superior audience to the genitals seems
reasonable.4" ° It also seems reasonable, however, to conclude that the brain
is a superior audience to the adrenals, and there is no reason to prefer
either the genitals or the adrenals over the other. If material is violent
enough to have a hormonal effect, Schauer's arguments would seem to
carry over to exclude such material from the protections of the freedom of
speech.
Schauer disagrees with this conclusion. He recognizes that violence
might be considered obscene4 ' but states:
[T]he arguments that relate to the exclusion of pornography
from the coverage of the Free Speech Principle are
inapplicable to violence as such. The sex-aid approach to
hard core pornography that shows such pornography to be
scarcely communicative at all does not appear relevant to
the depiction of violence. Although it is possible that a
refined categorization approach to freedom of speech might
grant publications featuring violence for its own sake (such
as a martial arts movie) less protection than would be
granted to, say, political speech, this would create problems
because of frequent use of violence to emphasize a moral
or political argument, as, for example, with the use of vivid
depictions of violent death in a motion picture intended to
point out the horrors of war.412
410 Schauer's position has been characterized as arguing "that because pornography
goes straight to the genitals without passing through intellectual processes it is better
characterized as sex than speech." Deana Pollard, Regulating Violent Pornography, 43
VAND. L. REV. 125, 135-36 (1990).
411 SCHAUER, supra note 380, at 179.
412 Id. at 185.
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His comparison is, however, not fairly made. In considering hard core
pornography, Schauer hypothesized a film with absolutely no content other
than close ups of sexual intercourse. There was no dialogue, no music, no
artistic expression, and for Schauer, no communication. Yet, when he turns
to a consideration of violence, he notes that violent depictions can be used
to make political or moral points.4 13 Although violent material can be so
used, so can pornographic material.
It is because Schauer eliminated the possibility of any political or
moral message from the film in his hypothetical that the argument has
power. An equivalent hypothetical of a film consisting of nothing but a
person being carved up with a chain saw, unaccompanied by music,
dialogue or artistic expression would be just as lacking in political, moral,
or any other message. It only would serve to stimulate a visceral reaction.
The brain would not be the audience, and the material should not come
within the scope of Schauer's Free Speech Principle. Just as pornographic
material begins to enjoy protection as it departs from the hypothetical
genre and starts to contain a message aimed at the intellect, so too might
violent material enjoy the protections of the First Amendment to the
degree that it departs from the hypothetical and contains political, moral,
or other messages aimed at the intellect.
Another theory, one which seems to combine elements similar to both
varieties discussed, has been developed by Professor Sunstein. He has set
out factors that may be used to classify speech as "low value" and thus
less entitled to protection:
First, the speech must be far afield from the central concern
of the first amendment, which, broadly speaking, is
effective popular control of public affairs .... Second, a
distinction is drawn between cognitive and noncognitive
aspects of speech. Speech that has purely noncognitive
appeal will be entitled to less constitutional protection.
Third, the purpose of the speaker is relevant: if a speaker is
seeking to communicate a message, he will be treated more
favorably than if he is not. Fourth, the various classes of
low-value speech reflect judgements that in certain areas,
government is unlikely to be acting for constitutionally
impermissible reasons or producing constitutionally
troublesome harms.414
413 Id.
414 Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
603-04.
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For Sunstein, pornography, let alone sexual obscenity, is low value
because it fails to express a position relevant to the popular control of
government, the first factor, and the government is less likely to have
acted for impermissible reasons or to cause a constitutionally troublesome
harm, the fourth factor.415 These two factors appear similar to the concern
that speech relevant to self-governance has the highest value.
The second and third factors also dictate less protection for
pornography. They seem somewhat akin to Professor Schauer's position
that sexual obscenity is non-speech.416 If material contains no message and
is intended to contain no message, it might be viewed as noncommunica-
tive. The scope of Sunstein's factors, however, may be wider than the
areas falling outside of the protected areas under Schauer's analysis.
In his comments on Sunstein's factors, Professor Alexander indicates
that all nonpropositional expression is unprotected and expresses concern
that such a distinction leaves unprotected a Diego Rivera mural, literature,
art, movies, and dance.4 17 He claims that, although such material may
convey ideas that could be presented as propositions, taken as a whole they
are nonproposit~onal 8 Even if one would want to consider art and music
that conveys ideas that could be expressed as propositional to itself be
propositional, that still would leave nonrepresentational art and music
unprotected.
If Alexander's view is the proper reading of Sunstein, more material
may'be unprotected than would be under Schauer's analysis. Music and
nonrepresentational art communicate emotive messages, even if they are
nonpropositional. This affective communication is noncognitive and fails
to meet Sunstein's second factor. It is not as clear that it fails Schauer's
test. For Schauer, obscenity is unprotected because it has nothing other
than a physical effect; the brain is not the audience. For music and art, the
brain is the audience, even if the message is emotive.
The result, with regard to pornography, however, is the same for
Sunstein as it is for Schauer. Sunstein says:
[M]ost pornography does not express a point of view on an
issue of public importance, any more than does a prostitute
or a rape or a sexual aid. In this respect, pornography is
critically different from a misogynist tract, which consists
of a direct appeal on an issue of public importance, one that
415 Id. at 606; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 Nw. U. L.
REV. 555, 560 n.18 (1989).
416 See supra notes 400-09 and accompanying text.
41" Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (1989).
418 id.
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engages cognitive capacities. With respect to both value and
harm, the fact that pornography is essentially a sexual aid
substantially strengthens the case for regulation.419
The response is also the same. Violence does not, in itself, express a point
of view on important issues; its effect is visceral and noncognitive.
Although violence may be used in a work expressing a point of public
importance, so may pornography. To the point the pornography has such
serious value, it is less obscene. To the point the violent depiction has such
content and such value, it too is less obscene. For each of the theories
examined, the theory applies to violent obscenity as well as to sexual
obscenity. Although one may agree or not with the theories, they provide
no basis for distinguishing between explicit sex and explicit violence.
VI. THE QUESTION OF VIOLENT EFFECTS
The policy issues already considered have been those underlying a
more general theory for the freedoms of speech and press. The issue of
violent effects is a policy issue, but it may be of a similar or different
variety than those already discussed. Material that produces violent effects
may be denied first amendment protection under a similar analysis. If the
material is nothing but an invitation to violence, it may fit within the
"fighting words" exception to the Amendment, established in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire. °
Professors Lockhart and McClure, in a pre-Roth article, suggest that
obscenity dicta in Chaplinsky42I also should be read to exclude only
obscenity that invites violence; it should be limited to expletives.422
"The casual nature of the inclusion of 'lewd and obscene' along with
libelous and insulting words is obvious. It seems likely that the Court
was thinking here of 'lewd and obscene' talk of a conversational or
419 Sunstein, supra note 415, at 560 n.18; see also Sunstein, supra note 414,'at 606.
Sunstein does limit pornography to material that produces sexual arousal by depicting
women as enjoying or deserving physical abuse. Id. at 592.
420 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
421 Id. at 571-72:
422 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 282, at 353. They cite several cases of which the
Court may have been thinking: Ricks v. State, 28 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. App. 1943) ("Come
here baby and kiss me, I am going to get into your pants." ); Dillard v. State, 41 Ga. 278
(1870) (defendant asking a woman "to go to bed with him"); People v. Casey, 67
N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1946) (soliciting sexual perversion); State v. Payne, 172 P.
1096 (Okla. Crim. 1918) (saying at a religious meeting "Will Jim Murphy make an
affidavit that he didn't go out and catch a sexual disease and give it to his wife." ); see
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 282, at 353 n.381.
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expletive, rather than literature. ' 423 It was, for them, the tendency to
incite violence that put such speech outside of the protection of the First
Amendment. Obscene speech was unprotected only in such a context, an
analysis that fit at least some of the early obscenity cases.424 Violent
speech would also be unprotected, if it represents nothing other than a
call to violence.
The other sort of policy analysis would recognize that there is nothing
in the general theory of first amendment protections that excludes the
materials under consideration. That recognition does not, however, mean
that the materials could never be banned. Finding that certain materials
produce violent effects could, if they represent a clear and present danger
of doing so, provide a basis for a ban on what would otherwise be
protected speech. There has, for that reason, been a great deal of concern
expressed over the possibility of pornography causing violence. The
thesis of this section is that this concern has been misdirected at
pornography. Although the issue of violent effects is extremely
important, its focus should be on depictions of violence rather than on
depictions of sex.
It is, as Professor Schauer has pointed out in yet another contribution
to the field,425 important to understand the variety of causation under
consideration. Obviously, a claim that certain depictions cause violence is
not to claim that every person exposed to such material commits acts of
violence, nor that only such people commit such acts. The issue is, instead,
one of probability and correlation. "The question ... is whether, in a
population in which every member was exposed to [the materials under
consideration], would there be more instances of... violence than there
would be in a population which had no exposure to such material? 426
There are several important studies and reports that attempt to answer
questions of the variety Schauer proposes. The 1970 President's
Commission on Obscenity and Pornography examined sexually obscene
material, without a focus on sexually violent obscenity or pornography.
The Commission concluded:
[E]mpirical research ... has found no evidence to date that
exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role
in the causation of delinquent or criminal behavior among
423 Id.
424 See supra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
425 Frederick F. Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 737.
426 Id. at 754. The quote specifically concerns sexually violent materials and sexual
violence, but the concept of causation is the same.
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youth or adults. The Commission cannot conclude that
exposure to erotic materials is a factor in the causation of
sex crime or sex delinquency.427
Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod examined the experimental evidence on
the question and agreed with the 1970 Commission that causation could
not be shown.428 They found the laboratory studies to be inconsistent, with
male aggressiveness toward women increasing after exposure to
pornography only when given multiple opportunities to aggress in the
"permission-giving" situation of the laboratory.429 One study in the
Commission's research that did purport to show an increase in verbal
aggression toward women after exposure to an erotic film, did so only
when the male subjects were told that they would see another erotic film
if they increased their verbal abuse.43°
Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod also examined research outside of the
laboratory and found it "even less conclusive. '4 31 They noted a difference
in studies on the comparison of rape rates as Denmark eliminated its
antipornography laws. John Court claimed to find an increase in Denmark
and a decrease where pornography restrictions were adopted,432 while
Kutchinsky showed no such rise.433 Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod suggest
that Court's data is "basically uninterpretable" and that the Kutchinsky
research is on a sounder methodological footing, though limited to Danish
society.434 Kutchinsky has been less charitable in his analysis of Court's
work, pointing out various instances of the misuse or misreporting of
statistics.4 35 Kutchinsky also points to research reaching his conclusions,
based on data from other countries.436
The Donnerstein, et al. analysis also suggests that at first glance there
may seem to be a correlation between the circulation of sex magazines and
rape rates in the individual states of the United States. They suggest
427 COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 27 (1970).
428 ELLIOTT DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 72 (1987).
429 id.
430 Id. at 51.
411 Id. at 107.
432 For an overview of John Court's results, see id. at 62-65.
411 Id. at 61-62.
414 Id. at 73.
41' Bert Kutchinsky, The Politics of Pornography Research, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
447 (1992).
436 Id.
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caution, however, in this conclusion.437 The better explanation might be
that both increase with the level of "hypermasculinity" in the states'
populations, as shown by the fact that the best relation to rape reports was
the circulation of Field and Stream and American Rifleman.438 In sum, they
support the conclusion of the 1970 Commission that the evidence does not
show that exposure to sexual obscenity leads to violence against women.
Just one year prior to the 1970 President's Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography's inability to conclude that sexual obscenity leads to
violence against women, the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence was able to find a link between television violence
and violent behavior in viewers.439 Years later, the National Institute of
Mental Health concluded:
The consensus among most of the research community is
that violence on television does lead to aggressive behavior
by children and teenagers who watch the programs. This
conclusion is based on laboratory experiments and on field
studies. Not all children become aggressive, of course, but
the correlations between violence and aggression are
positive. In magnitude, television violence is as strongly
correlated with aggressive behavior as any other behavioral
variable that has been measured....
The Staff Report to the Commission was clear in its conclusions that
mass media portrayals of violence have an effect on society. Among short
term effects, the report concludes that:
[e]xposure to mass medial portrayals of violence stimulates
violent behavior when-(a) Subjects are either calm or
anxious prior to exposure, but more so when they are
frustrated, insulted, or otherwise angered. (b) Aggressive or
violent cues are presented (e.g., weapons of violence). (c)
Subjects are exposed either to justified or unjustified vio-
lence, but more so when justified violence is portrayed.44'
437 DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 428, at 67.
411 Id. at 66-68, 73.
439 Id. at 118 (citing NATIONAL COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF
VIOLENCE (1969)).
440 Id. at 118-19 (quoting NAT'L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT OF NAT'L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH 6 (1982)).
44' 9 ROBERT BAKER & SANDRA BALL, MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE: A REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 376 (1969).
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The Report also found the following statements on long-term effects to be
"consistent with and suggested by the research findings and by the most
informed social science thinking":
Exposure to mass media portrayals of violence over a long
period of time socializes audiences into the norms, attitudes,
and values for violence contained in those portrayals [as
among other factors t]he primacy of the part played by
violence in media presentations increases.
Persons who have been effectively socialized by mass
media portrayals of violence will under a broad set of
precipitating conditions, behave in accordance with the
norms, attitudes, and values for violence contained in media
presentations. Persons who have been effectively socialized
into the norms for violence in the television world of
violence would behave in the following manner: ... They
would probably resolve conflict by the use of violence[,]
use violence as a means to obtain desired ends[,] use a
weapon when engaging in violence[, and i]f they were
policemen, they would be likely to meet violence with
violence, often escalating its level." 2
"[T]he general consensus seems to be that there is a positive, causal
relationship between television violence and subsequent aggressive
behavior."" 3
Against the background of these reports, the 1986 Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography convened to consider anew the issues faced
by the 1970 Commission. This time, in looking at violent effects, the 1986
Commission stressed violent pornography, which it believed to be
increasingly the most prevalent form of pornography.444 Although there
may be some question whether the violent variety of pornography is
becoming or has become the most prevalent form," 5 the question addressed
is important.
442 Id. at 376-77.
44' Donald Roberts & Christine Bachen, Mass Communication Effects, 32 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 307, 342 (1981).
444 ATTORNEY GEN'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 323 (1986)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
445 See, e.g., Daniel Linz et al., The Attorney General s Commission on Pornography:
The Gaps Between 'Findings "and Facts, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 713, 716.
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The conclusion of the 1986 Commission was that "substantial
exposure to sexually violent materials ...bears a causal relationship to
antisocial acts of sexual violence and, for some subgroups, to unlawful acts
of sexual violence. ' 4 46 As Professor Schauer, who served on the 1986
Commission, points out, this conclusion is not inconsistent with the
findings of the 1970 Commission.447 The 1970 Commission considered
sexually explicit materials generally, while the 1986 Commission focused
on sexually violent materials. It would be a misreading of the 1986 Report
to "make the unsupportable connection between sexual explicitness and
"1448sexual violence ....
Professor Schauer sums up the scientific evidence on the violent effects
of sexually violent and sexually explicit depictions:
The results of these experiments, which try to exclude the
spurious by first isolating sex without the violence and then
isolating violence without the sex, indicate most importantly
that the violence is clearly not spurious. That is, if the
violence disappears and we are testing only for the re-
lationship between sex and sexual violence, there is no
causal relationship, as the Report expressly announces. But
if the sexualization (and not just the sexual explicitness) of
the violence is eliminated, the evidence indicates that the
strength of the causal relationship diminishes. Thus,
although the studies indicate some relationship between
non-sexualized violence and attitudes about sexual violence,
or aggressive tendencies toward women, this relationship,
in probabilistic terms, becomes stronger when the sexualiza-
tion is added.449
The studies in the area of media sex, media violence, and violent
effects have been compiled and examined by Donnerstein, Linz, and
Penrod.450 The most telling of the studies presented is one by Donnerstein,
Berkowitz, and Linz l.4 1 The subjects, male college students, were angered
by one of the researchers. They then watched one of four films-aggressive
"6 FINAL REPORT, supra note 444, at 326.
4" Schauer, supra note 425, at 750.
44' Id. at 758-59 n.49.
I4 ld. at 765 (footnotes omitted).
45' DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 428, at 108-36. For a more concise overview of
the research and a discussion of Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod's work, see Steven A.
Childress, Reel 'Rape Speech " Violent Pornography and the Politics of Harm, 25 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 177 (1991).
45' DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 428, at 110.
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pornography, nonaggressive/noncoercive pornography, a film that depicted
aggression against women but with no sexual content, and a neutral film.
The subjects were then given the opportunity to aggress against one of the
researchers' confederates. There were no differences in aggression against
a female target between those who watched the sex-only film and those
who watched the neutral film. Those who watched the aggression-only film
were more aggressive against a female target than those who watched the
sex-only film or the neutral film. Violence in a film was more likely to
cause aggression than was sex.4"2
The authors do point out that the group most willing to aggress against
the female target was the group that had seen the aggressive
pornography. 53 Although it may be that violence, rather than sex, causes
violence, violence with sex is the most violence-provoking. "[T]he sexual
content of material is . . . relevant because the sexual content has a
synergistic effect with violence that results in the greatest likelihood of
harm." 454
Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod discuss desensitization to violence, and
in that discussion, sex plays a role that could explain the synergistic effect.
They suggest that:
if a film maker were to continually pair violent scenes with
relaxing music, or continually pair violence with pleasing
stimuli such as mildly erotic scenes, building from the least
fearful scenes to a climax of great fearfulness, desensitiza-
tion may occur very efficiently. The viewer would come to
associate, through conditioning, the previously anxiety-
provoking stimulus (violence) with the neutral or positive
response elicited by neutral scene or a mildly erotic
scene.
4 55
Their description of "slasher films" fits this desensitization model.
The carnage is usually preceded by some sort of erotic
prelude: footage of pretty young bodies in the shower, or
teens changing into nighties for a slumber party, or
anything that otherwise lulls the audience into a mildly
sensual mood. When the killing begins, this eroticism is
abruptly abandoned, for it has served its purpose, that of
452 id.
453 id.
454 Pollard, supra note 410, at 129.
455 DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 428, at 118.
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lowering the viewer's defenses and heightening the films
[sic] physical effectiveness. The speed and ease with [sic]
one's feelings can be transformed from sensuality into
viciousness may surprise even those quite conversant with
links between sexual and violent urges.456
It then remains that violence is the culprit. Sex, explicit or not, is
simply used to amplify the effect of that violence, to make the violence
more acceptable by associating it with positively received sexual images.
If violence is the true culprit, it makes more sense to ban material based
on its violence than based on the level of sexual explicitness. "[Tlhe most
reasonable conclusion that one can reach from the [1986] commission s
own statement is that depictions of violence against women, whether in a
sexually explicit context or not, should be the focus of concern. ,457
The only shortcoming of that conclusion is that it is too limited. The
conclusion of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, that violence in media causes violence, was not limited to vio-
lence against women. Although the presence of sexual content with
violence may focus against women any resulting violence and may
increase the likelihood of violent effects, it is violence that causes violence
and the victim of that violence may be either female or male.
VII. WHAT SORT OF STATUTE?
Miller v. Californiaa45 provides guidance in developing a statute
banning excessively violent depictions. In setting the test for sexual
obscenity, the Court in Miller stated that the question turned on
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.459
456 Id. at 114 (quoting Janet Maslin, Bloodbaths Debase Movies and Audiences, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1982, § 2, at 1.
4' Linz et al., supra note 445, at 721.
458 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
411 id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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The test requires only minor changes to shift the focus from sex to vio-
lence.46
Part (a) of the Miller test may require no change. The Roth Court had
defined "prurient" as "[i]tching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing;
of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire,
curiosity, or propensity, lewd .... ,,461 and as "a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters. ' 462 Parts of that definition can certainly carry over to violence.
A depiction of violence can go beyond community standards and appeal
to morbid longings, curiosity, or shameful or morbid interests, and thus
appeal to the prurient interest. Since "prurient" seems to have developed
an attachment to sexual activities, however, the best approach might be to
substitute "morbid or shameful" for "prurient."
The second factor must change to reflect the concern with violence
rather than sex. Rather than depicting sexual conduct, the test should be
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, acts of
violence specifically defined by the applicable state law. The state statute
must indicate clearly which depictions are banned-murder, rape,
aggravated assault, mayhem, and torture would all appear to be good
candidates. Not all depictions of such acts would be banned, just as not all
depictions of sexual acts are banned. Only depictions of sex and only
depictions of violence that are patently offensive could be banned.
The third factor in Miller need not change at all. If the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value and
meets the other factors, then it is violent obscenity. It is this factor that
would protect the violence in Shakespeare from prosecution, even in a
jurisdiction with an overzealous approach to banning violence.463 As is true
for sexual obscenity, the "serious value" prong should be judged on the
basis of a reasonable person, and not a local values standard.4 4
460 Childress notes that only a two-word change in the usual obscenity test is required
to include materials that are "patently offensive violent images which appeal to an
unhealthy interest in violence and are without serious social value." Childress, supra note
450, at 204. Childress argues that the courts should not make such changes. Id. State
statutes aimed at restricting access by minors to violent materials also have employed.
Miller-like definitions. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
461 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED (2d ed. 1949)).
462 Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.10(2) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957)).
16' The same factor could even justify public execution for its educational value, if it
is assumed that the death penalty has a deterrent effect or educational value.
41 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
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The statute banning distributions of depictions of violence that was
struck down in Winters was declared unconstitutional due to vagueness.161
The definition of violent obscenity proposed here should not suffer the
same fate, as it tracks the definition of sexual obscenity. With regard to
concerns that the Roth definition of sexual obscenity was too vague, the
Court said:
Many decisions have recognized that these terms of
obscenity statutes are not precise. This Court, however, has
consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive
to the requirements of due process. "[T]he Constitution
does not require impossible standards"; all that is required
is that the language "conveys sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practices . . . ." These words, applied
according to the proper standard for judging obscenity,
already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct
proscribed and mark . . . "boundaries sufficiently distinct
for judges and juries fairly to administer the law" ....
That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to
determine the side of the line on which a particular fact
situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language
too ambiguous to define a criminal offense . 466
There is no reason why such an approach to vagueness should be
applicable to sexual obscenity but inappropriate for violent obscenity.
There is another distinction between movies containing explicit sexual
activity and movies containing: explicit depictions of violence. Sexually
explicit movies, at least those falling into the hard-core category, present
film of actual sex acts. Violent movies, at least those from major
producers, do not present film of actual violence but rather of simulated
violence. That distinction, however, is insufficient to protect the violent
film. The Miller opinion provided, as an example of what a state statute
could define as obscene, under the second prong of the Miller test,
"patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated. '467 Statutes and case law agree
that simulation or description can be obscene.468
465 See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text.
466 Roth, 354 U.S. at 491-92 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947))
(other citations and footnotes omitted).
467 Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. (emphasis added).
468 All non-pictorial obscene publications may be considered to be simulations.
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Lastly, it should be noted that special statutes to protect youth from
exposure to violent material may be required. Even if a particular depiction
is not sufficiently offensive or does not appeal sufficiently to a morbid or
shameful interest in violence in adults to be classified as violent obscenity
as to adults, it still may be obscene as to youth. This difference also tracks
the law for sexual obscenity. Ginsberg v. New York 46 9 allowed such bans
for sexual material, and such a ban should carry over to violence. This is
especially important, since research indicates that "[d]istinctions between
fantasy and reality presentations of media violence are not consistently
perceived by child audiences."47 Even cartoon depictions of violence
appear to cause aggressive behavior in children.47'
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1969, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence found that media portrayals of violence can socialize viewers in
a culture of violence. 47 2 Twenty-four years of that enculturation, an
enculturation in which children see thousands of murders and 100,000
other acts of violence on television in their formative years, appear to have
had the effects predicted. The vigor with which this problem can be
attacked has been seen as limited by the protections of the First
Amendment, but the Amendment should not be an obstacle. Obscenity is
a recognized exception to the First Amendment. Although obscenity has
been limited to depictions of sexual or excretory activities, that limitation
is unfounded. Depictions of violence, even with no sexual content,
properly may be considered obscene.
The history of obscenity law does not support a limitation to sexual
obscenity. Obscenity was not well defined in the law until the late 1800s.
At that time, in a constitutionally irrelevant era, obscenity began to focus
on sex, but at the same time states passed laws against depictions of
violence, sometimes continuing to call such depictions obscene. Violence
as obscenity has as strong a legal history as sex as obscenity. Extra-legal
concepts of obscenity also speak as well to violence as they do to sex.
Policy reasons for excluding sexual depictions from protected speech
and press also apply as well, or better, to the exclusion of depictions of
violence. Although sexual obscenity may be something less than true
speech, so is violent obscenity. Although sexual obscenity may not go to
46' 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
470 BAKER & BALL, supra note 441, at 377.
471 Richard E. Goranson, A Review of Recent Literature on Psychological Effects of
Media Portrayals of Violence, in BAKER & BALL, supra note 441, app. III-A at 395, 401.
472 See supra notes 437-43 and accompanying text.
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the self-government core of the First Amendment, neither does violent
obscenity. Lastly, there is no indication that sexual obscenity causes
violence, but there is evidence that violent obscenity can cause violence.
Although that causation is even stronger, when combined with sex, it is the
violence that causes violence.
Although there may be good arguments against censorship, those
arguments have not carried the day. They were defeated in Roth and show
no signs of renewed vitality. The Constitution, for better or worse, simply
does not protect obscenity. What, however, is obscene? It has been the
thesis of this Article that violence is what is truly obscene. A society in
which sexual expression is limited, while violence runs rampant, does not
seem a better place than a society in which depictions of violence are
limited, and if the causation studies are correct, the level of violence is
reduced. History, policy, and the Constitution do not demand that we
accept a culture of violence. The explicit depiction of violence may be
obscene and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment.
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